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1. INTRODUCTION 
Under pressure from five applicant corporations wishing to provide inter-
continental communications satellite service, I the United States has reexamined 
its objectives in participating in the international communications network. 2 The 
United States now routes all of its commercial intercontinental communications 
satellite traffic over the International Telecommunications Satellite System (IN-
I The applicants wish to offer international communications satellite services between the United 
States and either Europe or Latin America. The implementation of such an enterprise requires 
authorization by the Federal Communications Commission wc.e.). See Application of Orion Satellite 
Corporation, File No. CSS 83-002-P (March II. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Orion Application]; Ap-
plication of International Satellite. Inc. (lSI). File Nos. CSS-83-004-P(LA); I-P-C-83-073 (August 12, 
1983) [hereinafter cited as lSI Application]; Application of RCA American Communications, Inc. for 
Modification of Authority, File Nos. 909-DSS-MP-84; I-T-C-84-085 (February 13, 1984) [hereinafter 
cited as RCA Americom Application]; Application of Cygnus Satellite Corporation. File No. CSS-84-
002-P(LA) (March 7, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Cygnus Application]; Application of Pan American 
Satellite Corporation (PanAmSat), File No. CSS-84-004-P(LA) (May 31. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 
PanAmSat Application]. 
2 In 1983, a Senior Interagency Group on International Communication and Information policy 
[hereinafter cited as SIG] studied the the applications. The SIG is co-chaired by representatives of the 
Departments of Commerce and State and consisted of representatives of the following agencies: the 
Departments of Justice and Defense; the Offices of Management and Budget. Science and Technology 
Policy, Policy Development, and the U.S. Trade Representative; the National Security Council; the 
Central Intelligence Agency; the U.S. Information Agency; the Board of International Broadcasting; 
the Agency for International Development; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
SENIOR INTERAGENCY CROUP ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION POLICY, A WHITE 
PAPER ON NEW INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS I n.1 (1985) (available in F.C.C. file for CC Docket 
No. 84-1299) [hereinafter cited as SIC Report] In 1983 the SIG recommended to President Reagan 
that new international systems were warranted, subject to certain restrictions. Id. at 2. See generally 
International Satellite Issues: Hearings on H.R. 4464 & H.R. 5724 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, 
Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong .• 2d Sess. 302-
30 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearings before the House Subcomm.] (Statement of David J. Markey, 
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information, U.S. Department of Commerce), July 25. 
1984. The SIC Report was released in February of 1985 with the intention of providing both back-
ground information regarding the President's separate satellite system determination, see infra note 5, 
and information on regulatory measures necessary to implement the executive policy goals. SIC Report 
at 2. See generally Hearings before the House Subcomm. at 3-4 (statement of Rep. John D. Dingell) (framing 
the issues presented by the applications). 
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TELSAT).3 Until recently, the United States advocated a single international 
system and opposed those countries which sought a world-wide network of 
regional satellite systems.4 On November 28, 1984, President Reagan deter-
mined that the national interest required international communications satellite 
systems, separate from the INTELSAT system.5 The President's determination 
supports a bifurcated approach; the INTELSAT global system will serve tele-
phone, record carrier, and data networks,6 while separate private systems may 
carry customized communications networks not interconnected with public 
switched message networks.7 On July 25, 1985 the Federal Communications 
Commission (F.C.C.) applied the Presidential Determination by conditionally 
authorizing international satellite systems separate from INTELSAT.8 The U.S. 
shift9 from supporting a single global system to advocating multiple interna-
tional regional systems calls into question the permissibility of separate systems 
under the Agreement Relating to the International Communications Satellite 
Organization. 10 
3 INTELSAT is a multilateral corporation owned, in part, by communications entities from 109 
countries. It operates a system of communications satellites that are accessible from anywhere on the 
globe. See generally THE INTELSAT GLOBAL SYSTEM, (S. Alper & J. Pelton, eds. 1984); R. COLINO, 
THE INTELSAT DEFINITIVE ARRANGEMENTS: USHERING IN A NEW ERA IN SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS, (EBU Monograph No.9 1973) [hereinafter cited as Monograph). 
4 In the late 1960's France envisioned INTELSAT as an intercontinental system, linking a series of 
regional systems. See infra notes 33-34. 
5 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, Presidential Determination 
No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (1984). 
6 See Letter from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, and Malcomb Baldrige, Secretary of Com-
merce, to Mark S. Fowler, Federal Communications Commission Chairman (November 28, 1984) 
[hereinafter cited as the SIG letter) (indicates the United States supports separate systems offering 
non-public-switched message services). See also SIG Report, supra note 2, at 34. A telecommunications 
satellite operates as a relay station in the sky. It receives and retransmits signals. See A. BELENDIUK & 
S. ROBB, BROADCASTING VIA SATELLITE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS 46-47 (1979). The SIG 
Report would restrict INTELSAT to carrying telephone, telegram, telex, TWX, facsimile, and high 
speed data services offered by international telephone carriers and international record carriers. See 
Report and Order, In re Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 
CC Docket No. 84-1299; FCC 85-399 at 1\114, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,266, 42,286 (1980) (effective on 
September 3, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Report and Order). See also ITT World Communications, 
Inc. v. F.C.C., 725 F.2d 732, 736-38 (1984); Overseas Com~unications Services, 92 F.C.C.2d 641, 
641-42 (1982) (historical background on the international telephone/record carrier dichotomy). 
7 The SIG Report indicates customized services "involve the sale or long-term lease" of satellite 
capacity for "intracorporate networks and television transmission." SIG Report, supra note 2, at 30. 
B See Report and Order, supra note 6. 
9 The shift reflects a change in U.S. communications priorities. In the past, the United States 
evaluated international communications satellite utility on the basis of global effect. See Statement by 
the Representative of the United States, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I1SRl2 at 5. Now such 
concerns are secondary to heavy user needs. See SIG Report, supra note 2, at 26. 
10 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "INTEL-
SAT," done August 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT 
Agreements). 
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Article XIV of the INTELSAT Agreements sets forth the requirements for 
members to establish non-INTELSAT communications satellite systems. 11 This 
Comment will therefore focus on various interpretations given to Article XIV 
requirements. First, the Comment will trace the history of INTELSAT and 
discuss its structure. The process for coordinating a separate satellite system 
under Article XIV of the INTELSAT Agreements will then be examined. The 
Comment will consider in detail three approaches to satisfying Article XIV 
requirements: first, that a separate system offering bulk capacity for sale or 
lease falls under Article XIV(e) as specialized services; second, that demand for 
satellite capacity will itself insulate INTELSAT from significant economic harm, 
Article XIV(d), caused by a separate system; and third, that, in any event, a 
separate system precluded from carrying public switched message service will 
not cause significant economic harm. Finally, the Comment will suggest the 
proper interpretation of Article XIV's requirements and application to the 
proposed international satellite systems. 
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF INTELSAT 
The United States initiated the world's commercial use of communications 
satellites. 12 In doing so the United States hoped to realize a number of objectives. 
In the international theater, these objectives included attracting developed coun-
tries to share in the costs of the new system,13 luring developing nations away 
from a feared Soviet system,14 and capturing goodwill by sharing its new tech-
nology.ls Domestically, the U.S. goals included rapid implementation of com-
mercial communications satellite service l6 and maintenance of the U.S. lead and 
control over communications satellite technology.17 
II Article XIV, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813. 3853. 
12 See BELENDIUK & ROBB, supra note 6, at 4. 
13 See generally Colino, Global Satellite Communications and International Organiwtion: A focus on Intelsat, 
10 COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 80, 82 (1968). 
14 See Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 598-99 (written statement of Joel R. Alper, 
President of COMSAT World Systems Division, quoting COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES: TECHNICAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, 87 CONG., 2D SESS. 25 (Comm. Print 1962)). See also 
J. KILDOW, iNTELSAT POLIcy-MAKER'S DILEMMA 20-21 (1973). 
15 See International Communication and Information Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, 
Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 156 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings before the Senate Subcomm.] (statement of Ambassador 
Abbott Washburn). 
16 See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962, S. REP. No. 1584, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2269 (purpose of bill). 
17 See KILDOW, supra note 14, at 46-49. The 1962 United States policy objectives may be summarized 
as follows: I) to provide the most advanced services available at the least cost within the shortest 
possible time; and 2) to make the system accessible to the world, even where such service would not 
be profitable. See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT OF 1962, S. Rep. 
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A. History of INTELSAT 
I. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 served to achieve the u.s. objective 
of swift implementation of a commercial satellite system. IS This Act created the 
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) to own and operate the U.S. 
portion of the international satellite system.19 In addition, the Act provided for 
the President of the United States to oversee the development and foreign 
policy aspects of the satellite system.20 The Federal Communications Commis-
sion (F.C.C.) was to regulate access and make rules regarding operation of the 
system,21 COMSAT was to plan the system by itself or in conjunction with 
foreign entities.22 
Evidence of the early U.S. commitment to a single global system can be found 
in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962,23 the pertinent part of which 
reads, " ... it is the policy of the United States to establish, in conjunction and 
in cooperation with other countries ... a commercial communications satellite 
system .... "24 The United States believed that communications satellite services 
were most effectively provided through a natural monopoly.25 There was also 
concern that separately controlled regional systems would be used to reestablish 
communications hegemonies. 26 
No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-27, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2269, 2287-88 
(Statement of President John F. Kennedy on Communication Satellite Policy). 
18 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. §§ 701-57 (1982)). See generally Note, Analysis of the Legal Authority for Establishment of Private 
International Communications Satellite Systems, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355, 361-68 (1984) 
(analysis of the Communications Satellite Act's legislative history). See also J. GALLOWAY, THE POLITICS 
AND TECHNOLOGY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 47-73 (1972) (political analysis of passage of the 
1962 Act). 
19 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-624, 76 Stat. 423 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 731 (1982)). See also BELENDIUK & ROBB, supra note 6, at 4. 
20 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 201 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 721(a) (1982)). 
See also GALLOWAY, supra note 18, at 81-87 (description of the initial relationship between the executive 
branch and COMSAT). 
21 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 201 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 721(c) (1982)). 
22 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 305 (codified as amended at47 U.S.C. § 735(a)(I) (1982)). 
2' See Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 77 (Washburn statement). 
24 Communications Satellite Act of 1962, § 102 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 701(a) (1982)). 
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 specifically reserves the right to create ". . . additional 
communications satellite systems, if required ... in the national interest." Communications Satellite 
Act of 1962, § 102 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1982)). 
25 See also M. SNOW, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS-EcONOMIC AND Po-
LITICAL ISSUES OF THE FIRST DECADE OF INTELSAT 99-100 (1976). See generally Colino, Global Satellite 
Communications, supra note 13, at 82. 
26 See Trooboff, INTELSAT: Approaches to the Renegotiation, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,58 (1968). 
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2. The Interim Arrangements 
In February of 1964, the United States began formal negotiations with foreign 
governments to set up an international communications satellite system.27 These 
negotiations were concluded with the signing of Interim Arrangements on 
August 20, 1964.28 Under the Interim Arrangements, each signatory owned a 
share of the system.29 COMSAT acted as manager, planning and constructing 
the system.30 The Interim Arrangements required that negotiations for defini-
tive arrangements begin after January 1, 1969. 31 
In the Interim Arrangements negotiation the United States championed the 
establishment of a single global system and opposed the use of separate sys-
tems. 32 The Europeans proposed that any party might establish additional com-
munications satellite systems if its national interest so required. 33 The negotia-
tions faltered on this issue.34 Three considerations temporarily resolved this 
impasse. First, the negotiators included language in the Preamble which advo-
27 See GALLOWAY, supra note 18. at 95. 
28 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite 
System, done August 20. 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 25 [hereinafter cited as 
Interim Arrangements). Original signatories were Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands. Norway. Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and the Vatican City. The Interim Arrangements consisted of two documents, one 
to be signed by by participating countries (parties), 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 
and one to be signed by the participating communications entities (signatories). Special Agreement, 
Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1745, T.I.A.S. 5646. 514 U.N.T.S. 48. The parties were the governments 
signatory to the Interim Arrangements who agreed to cooperate in the establishment of the space 
segment of INTELSAT. Article I. Interim Arrangements, 15 U.S.T. 1705, 1707; 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 28. 
The signatories were the governments or communications entities who agreed to pay the particular 
country's share of the development of the INTELSAT system. Article 3, Special Agreement. 15 U.S.T. 
1745. 1746; 514 U.N.T.S. 48. 50. For example, the United States was a party and COMSAT was a 
signatory. 
29 Article III, Interim Arrangements, supra note 28, 15 U.S.T. 1705. 1708; 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 30. 
Ownership of INTELSAT was determined in proportion to the signatories' respective contributions 
to the costs of establishing the system. See Article 5, Special Agreement, supra note 28, 15 U.S.T. 1745. 
1749; 514 U.N.T.S. 48. 52. The signatories contributions were determined under a quota system listed 
in the Annex of the Special Agreement, 15 U.S.T. 1778; 514 U.N.T.S 68. as modified by Article 
XII(c). 12 U.S.T. 1718; 514 U.N.T.S. 40-42. 
30 Article VIII. Interim Arrangements, supra note 28, 15 U.S.T. 1705. 1713; 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 36. 
INTELSAT was governed by an Interim Communication Satellite Committee consisting of signatories' 
representatives. Article IV. Interim Arrangements, 15 U.S.T. 1705. 1708-09; 514 U.N.T.S. 25. 30. 
31 Article IX(a), Interim Arrangements. supra note 28,15 U.S.T. 1705. 1713-14; 514 U.N.T.S. 25. 
36. 
32 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 
33 See GALLOWAY. supra note 18, at 94 (European countries sought to speak with one voice). See 
KILDOW, supra note 14, at 59 (Europeans advocated separate satellite systems as required by national 
interest). 
34 See Colino, International Telecommunicatious Satellite Organiwtion (INTELSAT), I MANUAL ON SPACE 
LAW 363. 374 (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee ed. 1979). 
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cated a single satellite system.35 Second, the effectiveness of the Interim Ar-
rangements was limited to five years, after which the issue would be open 
again.36 Finally, verbal exchanges between negotiators restricted members to 
satellite systems established under INTELSAT.37 
With the success of the geo-synchronous Early Bird satellite in 1965, the 
necessity for a single global system may have shifted from a technical one to an 
economic one. 38 Prior to 1965, the possibility existed that the international 
system would consist of twenty to fifty low-altitude random-orbiting satellites, 
thus necessitating an extensive network of earth stations addressed to a single 
global system.39 A complex random-orbit satellite system would have required 
global participation to finance equipment and coordinate scheduling.40 The geo-
synchronous41 system required only three satellites for global coverage thus 
requiring much less investment and coordination.42 The United States, however, 
maintained its strong commitment to the single global system concept based on 
the dual considerations of efficiency and benefit to developing countries.43 
European participants, on the other hand, asserted that non-INTELSAT re-
gional systems should be permitted.44 As the integrity of the U.S. single system 
position began to decline with the U.S. proposal to establish separate domestic 
satellite systems,45 the Europeans became more aggressive in their demands for 
separate regional systems.46 
35 See Preamble, Interim Arrangements, supra note 28, 15 U.S.T. 1705-06; 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 26-
27. 
'6 See generally GALLOWAY, supra note 18, at 95-98. See generally Colino, InterrUltional Telecommunications 
Satellite Organization, supra note 34, at 374. 
37 Colino, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, supra note 34, at 374. 
,. See Trooboff, supra note 26, at 57-59. See also KILDOW, supra note 14, at 60. See generally E. 
ROSTOW, FINAL REPORT: PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Chapter 3 at 10 
(December 7,1968) [hereinafter cited as ROSTOW REPORT] (the success of the geo-synchronous satellite 
changed INTELSAT's future). 
39 See Trooboff, supra note 26, at 57. 
40 See KILDOW, supra note 14, at 60. 
41 Geosyncronous satellites orbit the earth at 22,300 miles above the equator at the same speed as 
the globe turns. Thus the satellite appears stationary relative to the earth's surface. More advanced 
geostationary satellites also move north to south with the earth's seasonal changes. The satellites receive 
signals and relay them to other locations on the earth. See BELENDIVK & ROBB, supra note 6, at 13-14. 
See also E. FTHENAKIS, MANUAL OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, at 16-20 (1984) (a detailed explanation 
of orbital considerations). 
42 See KILDOW, supra note 14, at 60. 
4' See President's Message to Congress transmitting Recommendations Relative to World Commu-
nications, H.R. Doc. No. 157, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (August 14, 1967), reprinted in ROSTOW REPORT, 
supra note 38, Appendix at Tab A. 
44 In Europe, the global system concept was portrayed as merely a declaration of intention in the 
Interim Arrangements. See Trooboff, supra note 26, at 61-62. The European Aerospace Industry 
Association proposed that INTELSAT should only serve as an interconnection between regional 
systems. /d. For ajuxtaposition of the arguments for and against the single system concept see generally 
KILDOW, supra note 14, at 59-71. 
4.1 KILDOW, supra note 14, at 68-69. 
46Id. at 67-68. 
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By the beginning of the Definitive Arrangements47 negotiations in February 
of 1969, the INTELSAT global system was fully operational with satellites over 
the Atlantic (AOR), Pacific (POR), and Indian (lOR) Oceans.48 Membership 
increased from fourteen countries in 1964 to sixty eight in 1969.49 The nego-
tiations to create a permanent INTELSAT took place in Washington, D.C. and 
were held as three annual plenipotentiary conferences during late winter and 
spring from 1969 to 197 J.50 
3. The Definitive Arrangements 
The negotiations for the INTELSAT Agreements were concluded on May 
21, 1971,51 and entered into force in February of 1973.52 As with the Interim 
Arrangements, the Definitive Arrangements consist of two documents, a gov-
ernmental agreement signed by the parties and one signed by the signatories. 53 
The Definitive Arrangements indicate that INTELSAT's prime objective is to 
provide" ... the space segment required for international public telecommun-
ications services ... on a nondiscriminatory basis to all areas of the world."54 
In the Definitive Arrangements negotiations, the United States argued that 
INTELSAT should serve all the present and future international satellite com-
munications needs of its members.55 The United States asserted that parties and 
signatories should " ... agree that they shall not establish, or join in the estab-
lishment of, or use, any space segment other than INTELSAT space segment 
to meet international public telecommunications service requirements."56 Fur-
ther, the United States requested that the use of any non-INTELSAT space 
47 In the 1960s the permanent INTELSAT Agreements were often referred to as the "Definitive 
Arrangements." See supra text accompanying note 31. 
48 See GALLOWAY, supra note 18, at 148. 
49 See Note by the Department of State, Interim Arrangements, supra note 28, 17 V.S.T. 1705, 1743-
44; Colino, International Telecommunications Satellite Organimtion, supra note 34, at 372-73. 
50 Colino, International Telecommunications Satellite Organimtion, supra note 34, at 372. 
51 See generally, COLINa, Monograph, supra note 3, at 20. 
52 INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 V.S.T. 3813. 
53 See Article I(f) & (g), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 V.S.T. 3813, 3816 (definitions 
of parties and signatories). See also supra note 29. The signatories signed the Operating Agreement 
Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "INTELSAT', done Aug. 20, 
1971,23 V.S.T. 4091, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter cited as Operating Agreement]. 
54 Article IU(a), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 V.S.T. 3813, 3819. 
55 See COLINa, Monograph, supra note 3, at 90. 
56 INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Doc. 10 at 17. Space segment is the portion of the communi-
cations service which is relayed by the satellite. Ground segment is the portion of the communications 
service received from or transmitted to the satellite. See BELENDIUK & RODD, supra note 6, at 44-47 
(explanation of space segment facilities), 56-68 (explanation of ground segment facilities). 
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segment be subject to the approval of the Board when used for domestic, 
specialized or international specialized services. 57 
Another group of countries, led by France, argued that INTELSAT should 
not be granted a monopoly position over all international satellite communica-
tions.58 Their position was that regional public telecommunications satellite 
systems should be permitted upon coordination with INTELSAT.59 The re-
gional system advocates were concerned that INTELSAT was not awarding 
enough contracts outside the United States, and feared that an INTELSAT 
monopoly would impinge on their sovereignty in the area of communications.60 
Due to this conflict in the Definitive Arrangements negotiations, the United 
States made a compromise settlement whereby separate regional satellite systems 
would be permitted upon the approval of two-thirds of INTELSAT members.61 
While proposals had been made to allow separate regional systems defined by 
area of coverage,62 the U.S. compromise would allow separate systems if the 
members determined that such systems would not cause economic harm to 
INTELSAT.63 The parties to this compromise did not envision that the separate 
regional systems would offer service along INTELSAT routes.64 The single 
system concept was refined to include a global system that could be augmented 
by separate fringe regional systems.65 
B. Structure of INTELSAT 
Under the Definitive Arrangements, INTELSAT is organized in a four-tier 
structure.66 The participating countries meet in an Assembly of Parties [here-
inafter cited as the Assembly] every two years, or as needed, to set policy and 
render decisions on major changes in the status quo, for example, initiating 
57 See INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Doc. 10 at 17-18. See generally Donahue, A Discussion Of The 
Positions Taken By The United States In The Negotiations Of Definitive Arrangements For INTELSAT, 12 
COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 30,35-36 (1970). 
58 See INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I1SRl3 at 3. 
59 See COLINO, Monograph, supra note 3, at 92. 
60 See KILDOW, supra note 14, at 66. 
61 This settlement was eventually incorporated in Article XIV(d). See GALLOWAY, supra note 18, at 
161-62. See also KILDOW, supra note 14, at 72-73. 
62 See, e.g., Statemem by the Representative of the Netherlands, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires 
Com 1/22. 
63 See GALLOWAY, supra note 18, at 161-62. 
64 The principal proponents of separate regional systems agreed that these systems should not 
compete with INTELSAT. See Statement by the Representative of Japan, INTELSAT Travaux Prepar-
atoires Com I1SRl5 at 6 ("Separate regional public communications services would be acceptable if they 
did not compete with the globaliNTELSAT system ... "). Accord Statement by the Representative of 
France, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I/SRlII at 2. 
65 See Hearings before the House Subcomm. supra note 2, at 77 (Washburn statement). 
66 Article VI, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3824. 
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new INTELSAT services.67 The participating communications entItIes (signa-
tories) meet at least annually to consider issues relating to the operation of the 
system.68 The third tier is a Board of Governors [hereinafter referred to as the 
Board], made up of signatories' representatives with voting powers weighted in 
relation to investment share in the system.69 The representatives' voting partic-
ipationis determined by the investment share of their corresponding signatory 
or signatories. 70 Investment share is determined by the signatories' international 
public telecommunications use.7! The Board oversees the ongoing operation of 
the system and advises the Assembly and the Meeting of Signatories.72 Finally, 
a Director General, appointed by the Board, and confirmed by the Assembly,73 
is responsible for management of the system and reports to the Board.74 
The financial principles of the Definitive Arrangements call for each signatory 
to contribute capital to INTELSAT at a percentage rate relative to use.75 A 
service tariff scheme charges uniform prices for all users by type of use.76 
INTELSAT computes its tariffs by dividing total administrative capital and 
operating costs by the member's relative use for each type of service.77 Users 
are charged a unit cost by type of service regardless of volume.78 This nondis-
criminatory pricing structure insures that the lighter-volume users such as 
developing countries will have access to the system at the same rate as the large-
volume users.79 Moreover, lighter users do not have sufficient financial resources 
67 Article VII, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3824-28. The Assembly is 
governed by a one-party-one-vote rule and substantive decisions require approval by a two-thirds 
majority. Article VII (f), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3827. 
68 Article VIII, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3828-31 (Meeting of 
Signatories). The Meeting of Signatories is governed by a one-signatory-one-vote rule and substantive 
decisions require approval by a two-thirds majority. Article VIII(e), INTELSAT Agreements, supra 
note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3831. 
69 The board consists of representatives of the 13 heaviest users of the system plus between seven 
and nine at-large representatives of the lighter users. Article IX(a) & (b), INTELSAT Agreements, 
supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3832-33. Decisions on substantive matters demand either an affirmative 
vote of at least four governors representing at least two-thirds of the total voting participation or 
approval by at least the entire board minus three. Article IXU)(i), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 
10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3839. 
70 Article IX(f), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3836-37. 
7I Article IX(f) & (g), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.ST. 3813, 3836-38. 
72 Article X, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3840-45. 
73 Article XI(b)(iii), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3845. 
74 Article XI, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3845-47. 
75 Article V, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3822-23; Articles 6 & 7, 
Operating Agreement, supra note 53, 23 U.S.T. 4091, 4096-4102. 
76 Article V(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.ST. 3813, 3823; Article 8, Operating 
Agreement, supra note 53, 23 U.S.T. 4091, 4103. 
77 Article 8(a), Operating Agreement, supra note 53, 23 U.S.T. 4091, 4103. 
78 Article V(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 76. 
79 See Hearings before the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 152-53 (Colino statement) (deployment 
of facilities and non-discrimination mandate). 
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or technical capability to utilize their own separate satellite systems and thus 
benefit by the global availability of INTELSAT.RO 
Innovations in satellite technology and further disparity in economic devel-
opment among participating countries, however, has created a split over the 
nondiscrimination objective.8l The SIG Report implies U.S. demand for ad-
vanced services has outstripped INTELSA T's development and implementation 
of services. 82 Furthermore, the F.C.C.'s report and order infer that INTELSAT's 
nondiscrimination mandate binds it to less efficient technology from the single 
high volume user's point of view.83 
Ill. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Since the signing of the Definitive Arrangements, INTELSAT parties have 
coordinated the creation of six separate international satellite systems.84 In each 
of these cases, INTELSAT determined that the separate system would not 
significantly harm the global system.85 The first and second Assembly of Parties 
considered the U.S. MARISAT system.86 The initial proposal was approved in 
1974 and was renewed in 1982.87 In 1979, twenty-two countries proposed the 
European Communications Satellite Network (ECS).88 The ECS system was 
originally approved to carry international public telecommunications traffic and 
some television traffic. 89 In 1980, and again in 1982, INTELSAT reviewed the 
expansion of the ECS system, first for spare capacity and then for new digital 
80 See id. at 157 (Washburn statement). INTELSAT may vary prices by type of service. Its charges 
reflect volume to a degree, offering preferential rates for long-term leases of bulk capacity and higher 
per unit rates for capacity-on-demand services. See generally id. at 109-131 (Appendix No.5 to Colino 
written statement) (elements of INTELSAT service charges). See al<o SNOW, supra note 25, at 47-86. 
81 Cost averaging is premised on uniform use of the facilities. As long as all members are well served 
by one technology, cost averaging only incorporates price subsidies. When there are disparities in 
technology demands, however, non-discrimination may adversely affect communications utility. If the 
United States and Great Britain, for example, require a satellite system tailored to their needs but the 
INTELSAT Agreements restrict them to the use of less focused and less sophisticated INTELSAT 
facilities, for the purposes of subsidy by cost averaging, coSt averaging undermines the usefulness of 
the medium. 
82 SIG Report, supra note 2, at 26-27. 
83 Report and Order, supra note 6, at 42,278 ~ 69. 
84 See Policies, Criteria and Procedures for the Evaluation of Separate Systems Under Article XIV(d), 
INTELSAT Doc. BG-60-69E W/9/84 (22 August 1984) at 34-35 [hereinafter cited as Policies, Criteria 
and Procedures] (Table No. I). 
85 See infra text accompanying notes 169-203 (criteria for coordination). 
86 The United States proposed the provision of international maritime radio satellite service on the 
MARISAT system. See Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at Appendix A, 1-3. 
87 [d. at 8. 
88 Report of the Board of Governors to the Assembly of Parties Pursuant to Article XIV(d) Con-
cerning Coordination of the European Communications Satellite System, INTELSAT Doc. AP-4-7E 
M/4179 BG-37-54E W/3179 (March 16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ECS 1 Coordination] 
89 [d. at 3. 
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business services.90 The Polynesian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil-
lippines, Singapore, and Thailand submitted the PALAPA-B network for co-
ordination in 1978.91 The system was approved by INTELSAT in 197992 and 
1980.93 In 1979, all the Arab states within the Arab League sponsored ARAB-
SAT for coordination.94 The ARABSAT system was approved in 1980 to pro-
vide public telecommunications, television and direct broadcast television, and 
business services. 95 In 1980, Algeria received approval to use the Soviet IN-
TERSPUTNIK satellite system for telephone and television service.96 
The United States' involvement in separate public international systems has 
been the use of domestic satellites for telecommunications with neighboring 
countries.97 In Transborder Satellite Video Seroices,98 the F.C.C. ruled that the 
Communications Satellite Act of 1962 permitted such use only "where necessary 
to meet U.S. needs and respond to the rapidly changing satellite technology. "99 
The F.C.C. approved the U.S. applications to permit: 1) U.S.-Canada television 
service via Canadian domestic satellites; 2) U.S.-Canada television service via 
U.S. domestic satellites; 3) U.S.-Caribbean television service via U.S. domestic 
satellites; and 4) U.S.-Costa Rica television service via U.S domestic satellites.lOo 
90 Article XIV(d) Consultation For The EUTELSAT 1-2 (Spare) Network Of The ECS System, 
INTELSAT Doc. BG-43-I7E W/9/80 at 3 (August 22, 1980). Article XIV(d) Consultation Concerning 
Potential Economic Harm to INTELSAT By The Planned European Communications Satellite System, 
INTELSAT Doc. BG-52-4IE W/9/82 at 2 (August 20,1982) [hereinafter cited as ECS II Coordination]. 
Satellites have digital business uses such as interactive computer communications, sales ordering, and 
graphics transmission. See J. MARTIN, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEMS, 291-94 (1978). 
91 Report of the Board of Governors to the Assembly Of Parties Pursuant To Article XIV (d) 
Concerning Coordination Of The PALAPA-B Satellite System, INTELSAT Doc. AP-4-8E M/4i79 BG-
37-53E W/3i79 (March 16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as PALAPA-B Coordination]. 
92 !d. 
9' In 1980, the members of the PALAPA-B satellite system asked that the PALAPA-A system be 
expanded to international status. Article XIV(d) Consultation Concerning Potential Economic Harm 
to INTELSAT by the PALAPA-A Satellite System, INTELSAT Doc. BG-43-55E W/9/80 (September 
4, 1980) [hereinafter cited as PALAPA-A Coordination]. 
94 Report of the Board of Governors to the Assembly of Parties Pursuant to Article XIV Concerning 
Coordination Of The Arab Communications Satellite System (ARABSAT), INTELSAT Doc. AP-5-8E 
0/4/80 BG-41-5IE W/3/80 (March 14, 1980) [hereinafter cited as ARABSAT Coordination]. 
95 !d. at 3. 
96 Article XIV(d) Consultation Concerning Potential Economic Harm To INTELSAT By Algeria's 
Planned Use Of The INTERSPUTNIK System, INTELSAT Doc. BG-43-43E W/9/80 (August 28, 
1980) [hereinafter cited as AlgeriaiINTERSPUTNIK Coordination] 
97 Article XIV(d) Consultation Concerning The Potential Economic Harm To INTELSAT By The 
Planned Use Of Domestic Satellite Systems To Extend Telecommunications Services Between Canada 
And The United States, INTELSAT Doc. BG-52-17E W/9/82 (September 7,1982) [hereinafter cited 
as Transborder I Coordinations]. Article XIV(d) Consultation Concerning Potential Economic Harm 
To INTELSAT By The Planned Use Of The RCA SATCOM Satellite System By Bermuda, BG-52-
64E W/9/82 (September 2, 1982). See also SIG Report, supra note 2, at 21. 
98 Transborder Satellite Video Services, 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981). 
991d. at 273. 
100 !d. at 286. 
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In a related decision, the F.C.C. approved U.S.-Canada private networks over 
a U.S. domestic satellite. lol The F.C.C. reasoned that while existing INTELSAT 
facilities might be capable of providing some of these services,102 the use of 
INTELSAT would be uneconomical for the services proposed.lo3 The F.C.C. 
order permitting such services was conditioned upon successful coordination 
with INTELSAT under Article XIV(d).104 
Currently, the U.S. is experiencing an increased need for international com-
munications capabilities. !Os After reviewing U.S. needs for international satellite 
communications, the SIC recommended that separate systems be permitted for 
non public-switched message transmissions. 106 The F.C.C.'s Report and Order 
accepting the SIC findings implies that the INTELSAT system does not fulfill 
U.S. needs for services. 107 While the precise deficiencies in the INTELSAT 
system remain unclear, !Os they are perhaps best discovered by examining the 
proposals of the various applicants. The majority of applicants wish to offer 
east/west service between the continental United States (CONUS), Western Eu-
rope and Northern Africa.lOg The proposed traffic services over these routes 
include: sold and leased transponder capacity,110 video distribution,lll telecon-
ferencing,112 high, medium, and low speed data communications,ll3 high speed 
101 Satellite Business Systems, 88 F.C.C.2d 195,212 (1981). 
102 Satellite, 88 F.C.C.2d at 205-06; Transborder, 88 F.C.C.2d at 279-80. 
103 Satellite, 88 F.C.C.2d at 206-07; Transborder, 88 F.C.C.2d at 280-81. 
104 Satellite, 88 F.C.C.2d at 212; Transborder, 88 F.C.C.2d at 286. 
105 See NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION AGENCY (N.T.LA.) FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON 
COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS. LONG RANGE GOALS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION: AN OUTLINE FOR UNITED STATES POLICY, 5-6 
(Comm. Print 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as N.T.LA., LONG RANGE GOALS]; SIG Report, supra note 
2, at 6. 
106 SIG Report, supra note 2, at 30-31. 
107 Report and Order, supra note 6, at 42,278111169-71. 
108 The SIG Report merely cites "diversity and flexibility" as the basis for approving new systems. 
SIG Report, supra note 2, at 26. The Report and Order lists the differences between current INTEL-
SAT offerings and the applicants' proposed services as: I) satellite power capacities; 2) area of coverage 
and connectivity; and 3) opportunity to purchase or lease transponders on a long-term basis. Report 
and Order, supra note 6, at 42,278 11 73. 
109 Orion Application, supra note I, at I-I; lSI Application, supra note I, at 1,3; RCA Americom 
Application, supra note I, at I; Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 18. The application by PanAmSat 
differs in that it proposes a primarily north/south service between the eastern United States and Latin 
America as well as domestic services for Latin American countries. PanAmSat Application, supra note 
I, at 2. The PanAmSat proposal also includes service between the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America. 
110 A satellite's capacity may be sold or leased as personal property by the satellite operator/vendor. 
The purchaser has a property interest in a portion of the satellite's capacity. See Orion Application, 
supra note I, at 1-9-11. 
III Video distribution is the communication of television and video images by satellite. See BELENDIUK 
& ROBB, supra note 6, at 18-20. 
112 By means of satellite transmission of voice and images, meetings may be conducted in disparate 
locations connected electronically. See id. at 174. 
113 Data may be transmitted between computers and terminals at various speeds via satellite. See 
MARTIN, supra note 90, at 276-77. 
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facsimile, 114 and electronic mail. 1l5 A common advantage of the separate systems 
is greater flexibility in earth station requirements. 116 The applicants propose to 
use small, inexpensive dish antennae for access to their satellites. 117 
IV. ARTICLE XIV 
Article XIV of the INTELSAT Agreement contains the rights and obligations 
of parties and signatories. IIB Provisions within Article XIV outline the process 
and criteria for the parties' use of separate systems. 119 These provisions incor-
porate a series of steps designed to avoid inflammatory actions and to preserve 
the economic viability of INTELSAT international public telecommunications 
services. 12o This section reviews the provisions of Article XIV, the process for 
coordination of separate systems with INTELSAT under Article XIV(d), and 
the criteria applied in previous Article XIV(d) system coordinations. 
Article XIV(a), (b), (c), and (g) set out the parties' rights and obligations 
concerning matters not directly related to the establishment of separate inter-
national public telecommunications satellite systems. Article XIV of the IN-
TELSAT Agreement demands l21 that the parties" ... continue the develop-
ment of [the INTELSAT] telecommunications satellite system with the aim of 
achieving a single l22 global commercial telecommunications satellite system .... "123 
114 Facsimile telecommunication is the transmission of images such as pages of text via satellite. 
115 Letters may be telecommunicated between computers via satellite. See generally lSI Application, 
supra note 1, at 9-16; RCA Americom Application, supra note I, at 4-10; Cygnus Application, supra 
I, at 15-29. 
116 The earth station is the antennaltransmitter device located on the ground as part of the satellite 
system. See, e.g., lSI Application, supra note I, at 10. See generally BELENDIUK & ROBB, supra note 6, at 
56-68. 
117 See Orion Application, supra note I, at 11-47; lSI Application, supra note I, at 32-33; Cygnus 
Application, supra note I, at 17. 
118 Article XIV, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813,3853-55. 
119 Article XIV(c), (d), (e) & (g), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3853-55. 
120 See COLlNO, Monograph, supra note 3, at 92-94. 
121 Article XIV(a), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3853. 
The Parties and Signatories shall exercise their rights and meet their obligations under this 
Agreement in a manner. fully consistent with and in furtherance of the principles stated in 
the Preamble and other provisions of this Agreement. 
INTELSAT Director General Richard R. Colino has opined that Article XIV(a) may bind a Party to 
refrain from acts which might defeat INTELSAT's object and purpose. See Review of Certain Obli-
gations of INTELSAT Members Under the INTELSAT Agreements, With Particular Reference to 
Article XIV(d), Attachment No.1 to INTELSAT Doc. BG-60-62E W/9/84 at 6-8 (August 15, 1984) 
[hereinafter cited as Certain Obligations]. 
122 In the INTELSAT Agreements negotiations, France objected repeatedly to the word "single" in 
the Preamble. A particularly sticky point was the interrelationship between the single system concept 
in the Preamble, see supra text accompanying notes 55-60, and the rights and obligations of the Parties 
now found in Article XIV. In attempting to persuade France to abandon its reservations on the word 
"single," the United States argued "single" referred specifically to the fact that there was only one 
global system. The United States suggested that the word be retained with the understanding that it 
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The Preamble also indicates INTELSAT should be organized to "permit all 
peoples to have access," and that the system be available on a "global and 
nondiscriminatory basis."124 Thus, Article XIV (a) requires the parties and sig-
natories to support the single system concept. I25 
Article XIV(c) relates to a party or signatory using a system separate from 
INTELSAT for domestic public telecommunications requirements. I26 Proposals 
for domestic service routing over a separate system are presented only to the 
Board for consultation on technical compatibility with the INTELSAT system. 127 
While the Definitive Arrangements do not define precisely domestic services, 
Article III(b)(i) indicates such transmissions are between areas within a single 
state. I28 Recently, the distinction between domestic and international satellite 
systems has been blurred by U.S. use of domestic facilities for communication 
with Bermuda and Canada. I29 Ultimately, however, international use of domestic 
facilities has been coordinated under Article XIV(d).I30 
Satellite systems established for national defense purposes are exempted from 
Article XIV considerations by Article XIV(g).I3I Although the United States 
Department of Defense is the largest single U.S. user of INTELSAT facilities, 132 
there exists a highly sophisticated network of satellites separate from INTEL-
SAT dedicated to national security purposes.I 33 
A. Article XIV( d) 
Article XIV(d) provides the criteria for establishing separate systems for 
international public telecommunications services. 134 The provision was designed 
was not intended to modify the Article on rights and obligations. See INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires 
PC(III)/WG-C/SRJI4 at 2 (February 25, 1970). 
123 Preamble, INTELSAT Agreements. supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3814. 
124Id. at 3814-15. 
125 Sweden, France, and Jamaica questioned the need for Article XIV(a). See INTELSAT Travaux 
Preparatoires IWG/SRJ10 (May 22, 1970). The Article was ultimately adopted because "it stated a clear 
recognition of the commitment being entered into, and the intention to meet the obligations set forth 
in the Agreement." INTELSAT Trauaux Preparatoires Com A/SRJ14 at 3 (April 29, 1971). 
126 Article XIV(c), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 119. 
m Article XIV(c), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 119. See Domestic Communications-Satellite 
Facilities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 94 (1970). See also Colino, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 
supra note 34, at 388-89; COLINa, Monograph supra note 3, at 96-98. 
12R Article III(a) defines INTELSAT's prime objective as being "the provision, on a commercial basis, 
of the space segment required for international public telecommunications ... " (emphasis added). 
Article III(b)(i) indicates that domestic services, " ... between areas separated by areas not under the 
jurisdiction of the State concerned ... shall be considered international." It may be inferred that 
domestic services are those between contiguous areas of the state. Article III, INTELSAT Agreements, 
supra note 54. 
129 See text accompanying notes 98-104. 
130 See generally Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97. 
131 Article XIV(g), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.ST. 3813, 3855. 
\32 See SIG Report, supra note 2, at 43. 
133 See SNOW, supra note 25, at 100-0 I. 
134 Article XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3854. 
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to discourage INTELSAT members from participating in separate satellite sys-
tems that might offer services in competition with INTELSAT's international 
public telecommunications service offerings. I35 Prior to using a separate system, 
members or persons within the member's jurisdiction must consult with IN-
TELSAT to avoid technical interference,136 significant economic harm,137 and 
prejudice to direct links between INTELSAT participants over the INTELSAT 
system. 138 
B. Article X/Vee) 
Article XIV (e) applies to a member proposing to use a separate system of-
fering "specialized telecommunications services."139 Under Article XIV(e) the 
proposal is coordinated through the Board and the Assembly to avoid technical 
Id. 
To the extent that any Party or Signatory or person within the jurisdiction of a Party intends 
individually or jointly to establish, acquire or utilize space segment facilities separate from 
the INTELSAT space segment facilities to meet its international public telecommunications 
services requirements, such Party or Signatory, prior to the establishment, acquisition or 
utilization of such facilities, shall furnish all relevant information to and shall consult with 
the Assembly of Parties. through the Board of Governors, to ensure technical compatibility 
of such facilities and their operation with the use of the radio frequency spectrum and orbital 
space by the existing or planned INTELSAT space segment and to avoid significant economic 
harm to the global system of INTELSAT. Upon such consultation, the Assembly of Parties, 
taking into account the advice of the Board of Governors, shall express, in the form of 
recommendations, its findings regarding the considerations set out in this paragraph, and 
further regarding the assurance that the provision or utilization of such facilities shall not 
prejudice the establishment of direct telecommunication links through the INTELSAT space 
segment among all the participants. 
135 Article XIV(d) protections are triggered when potential competition would arise from the pro-
posed separate system. See INTELSAT Doc. ICSC-36-58 W/12/68 at 92, ~ 598-600 
K. Rights and Obligations of the Parties . .. 
1. General Obligations, 
A majority of the Committee recommends that each Participating State obligate itself not to 
establish, or join in the establishment of, a space segment in competition with the space segment 
of the Organization. 
(emphasis added). Compare Article XIV(d), supra note 134, protections (technical compatibility, no 
significant economic harm, and no prejudice to direct communications links) with Article XIV(c), supra 
note 119, protections (technical compatibility). See also supra text accompanying notes 61-65. 
Public telecommunications are defined in Article I(k) as between approved earth stations having 
access to INTELSAT. Article I(k), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3816. 
International public telecommunications has been equated with the Article I(k) definition. See Colino, 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, supra note 34, at 376. See infra note 232 for the 
full text of Article I(k). See also infra text accompanying notes 366-67. 
136 See infra text accompanying notes 172-75. 
137 See infra text accompanying notes 176-95. 
13S Article XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements. supra note 134. See infra text accompanying notes 196-
203. 
139 Article XIV(e), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3854-55. Generally, 
specialized services are those not offered by I NTELSAT signatories. See infra text accompanying notes 
238-42. 
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interference. 140 Specialized services are defined in Article 1(1) as satellite services 
that are not public as defined in Article I(k).141 
C. Article XIV(/) 
Upon the submission of a proposal under Article XIV(c), (d), or (e), Article 
XIV(f) sets out the time frame for the coordination procedures. 142 Within six 
months of the presentation to INTELSA T of the formal proposal, the appro-
priate body must render its recommendations. 143 Article XIV(f) supplements 
Article VII to permit an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly of Parties to 
be convened to render recommendations if mandated by Articles XIV(d) or 
(e).144 
D. Article XIV(d) Coordination Process 
The authorization process for separate systems begins with a proposal con-
sidered internally by the country or countries wishing to launch the system. 145 
In the United States, the private interest wishing to offer service initiates the 
process with an application to the F.C.C.146 Upon the F.C.C.'s passage of the 
application, the Department of State consults with the foreign communications 
authority involved in the proposal. 147 COMSAT and the corresponding signa-
tory theq. formally submit the proposal to INTELSAT to be coordinated under 
Article XIV.148 
Under Article XIV(d), the Director General analyzes the potential economic 
and technical effects of the separate system on INTELSAT and reports to the 
140 Article XIV (e), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 139. 
141 See infra note 232 (discussion of the public/specialized dichotomy and full text of Article 1(1)). 
142 Article XIV(f), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3855. 
143 /d. Formal consultation is deemed to commence when INTELSAT has all the information 
necessary to make its findings. See, e.g., ECS I Coordination, supra note 88, at 2. 
144 Article VII(d) calls for biennial meetings of the Assembly of Parties. Article VII(d), INTELSAT 
Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3827. Article VII(e)(i) permits extraordinary meetings of 
that body. Article VII(e)(i), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3827; Article 
XIV(f), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3855. 
145 See, e.g., ARABSAT Coordination, supra note 94, at 3; see also Hearings before the House Subcomm., 
supra note 2, at 338-39 (Statement of William Schneider, Jr., Undersecretary to the Department of 
State). 
146 See, e.g., Transborder Satellite Video Service, 88 F.C.C.2d 258, 261-66 (1981). See supra text 
accompanying notes 98-107. 
147 The foreign communications authority is usually the communications entity to be linked with the 
United States through the separate system. See Transborder, 88 F.C.C.2d at 283-84. 
148 See, e.g., Attachment No.1 to the Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97 (example of a joint 
submission by COMSAT and Teleglobe Canada). 
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Board. 149 The Director General assesses the economic effects of the proposed 
system in accordance with four criteria: 1) expected date of commencement; 2) 
type of service and area of coverage; 3) participants; and 4) intended traffic 
and duration. ISO The proposing party bears the burden of proving that its system 
causes neither technical interference nor "significant economic harm" to IN-
TELSAT.ISI The Board reviews the Director General's report and then may 
either request more information l52 or express its recommendations and advice 
to the Assembly.ls3 
The Board must perform its analysis and the Assembly must make recom-
mendations within six months of the proposal's submission. 154 These recom-
mendations are made in the form of findings regarding the technical compat-
ibility, economic consequences and the effect on direct telecommunications links 
within the INTELSAT system. 155 Further, the Assembly may recommend time 
or scope limitations, which, if exceeded, would require a new Article XIV(d) 
process. 156 The Assembly may, upon a negative recommendation, propose a 
resolution to make the alternative system technically and economically com pat-
ible. 157 
INTELSAT, the United States, and the applicants agree that the recommen-
dations of the Assembly of Parties are not legally binding on the parties. 158 The 
United States has indicated it will not be bound by a negative finding under 
Article XIV (d) if it considers itself to have met its obligations in good faith. 159 
149 Annex A, ~ 17 & Annex B, § (l)(p) INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3873 
& 3877. The Director General has absorbed the functions of both the Secretary General and the 
Management Services Contractor. Article XII (i), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 
3813,3851. 
150 As prescribed by INTELSAT Doc. B(;-28-63. See, e.g., Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 
97, Attachment No.1 at 2-3. 
151 See Transborder, 88 F.C.C.2d at 284. See also COLI NO, Monograph, supra note 3, at 94. 
I52 See, e.g., ECS II Coordination, supra note 90; Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97, at 
Attachment No.2 (letter to Joel R. Alper and Robert Seguin). 
153 Article X(a)(xxv), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3844. The United 
States position in the Definitive Arrangements negotiations was that the Board should have binding 
authority over the establishment of separate systems. See Donahue, supra note 57, at 36. 
154 Article XIV(f), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 142 (six months from the date the coordi-
nation material is received); Article VII(c)(vii), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T 3813, 
3826. 
155 See, e.g., Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at Appendix A (findings of the Assembly 
regarding Article XIV(d) coordinations). 
156 See, e.g., ECS I Coordination, supra at 88, at 8 ~ 18d. 
157 See Certain Obligations, supra note 121, at 3-4. 
158 See id. at 4; Transborder, 88 F.C.C.2d at 284; N.T.LA., LONG RANGE GOALS, supra note 105, at 
119; Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 513 (statement of William 1.. Fishman, lSI 
Attorney); See also Colino, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, supra note 34, at 389. 
159 See Letter from James 1.. Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and 
Technology, to Mark Fowler, Federal Communications Commission Chairman (july 23, 1981) (Ap-
pendix A to Transborder at 287-89). See also COLlNO, Monograph, supra note 3, at 94-95. The SIG 
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INTELSAT asserts that the parties must consider the Assembly's recommen-
dations in good faith and explain any reasoning behind a decision not to follow 
them. '60 
Should a dispute arise in establishing separate systems, the Definitive Ar-
rangements provide for settlement through arbitration. '61 Before going to ar-
bitration the conflicting parties must first attempt to settle the disagreement 
through negotiation. '62 If such efforts are not fruitful within a reasonable time, 
the dispute is submitted to arbitration. 163 The three-member arbitration tribunal 
is made up of a president, selected from a pool of legal experts,164 and one 
member designated by each side. 165 The tribunal's decision is binding on the 
parties. '66 In extreme cases, the alleged offending party may be subject to legal 
sanctions l67 or INTELSAT internal actions, such as expulsion. '68 
E. Criteria for Article XIV( d) Coordination 
The coordination of a separate system under Article XIV(d) requires the 
Assembly make recommendations under three categories: 1) technical; 2) eco-
nomic; and 3) direct communications links. '69 Previous separate system coor-
dinations with INTELSAT have been evaluated on a case-by-case basis. '70 This 
process has yielded a confused array of criteria developed specifically to address 
approach to Article XIV(d) obligations may shed new light on stich good faith requirements by defining 
the U.S. position on what constitutes good faith consideration. If the United States considers user-
dedicated facilities as beyond the scope of economic harm consideration, it may not follow Assembly 
of Parties recommendations which would incorporate such services in INTELSAT's traffic base. See 
SIC; Report, supra note 2, at 34-35. 
160 See Certain Obligations, supra note 121, at 5. 
1Ii1 Disputes between parties or between parties and INTELSAT" ... shall be submitted to arbitration 
.. " under Annex C if not " ... settled within a reasonable time .... " Article XVIII(a), INTELSAT 
Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3865; Annex C, INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 
23 U.S.T. 3813, 3880-89. See generally Colino, Arbitration Provisions Governing International Commercial 
Communications Satellites, 15 COLLOQUIUM ON THE L. OF OUTER SPACE 59 (1973). 
162 Annex C Article 4(a)(iii). INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3883. 
163 Article XVIII(a), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 161. See aLw Certain Obligations, supra 
note 121, at 20-21. 
164 Annex C, Article 3(a) & (b), INTELSAT Agreements, ~upra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3880-81. 
lIiS Annex C, Articles 4(a)(v) & 5(a), I:--JTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3883-
84. 
166 Annex C Article l3(b), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3889. See generally 
Colino, Arbitration Provisions, supra note 161, at 64-65. 
167 See Certain Obligations, supra note 121, at 11-16 (analysis of remedies l'nder international law). 
108 Article XVI(b)(i), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3857. Article XVI 
empowers the Assembly to oust parties. It is unlikely that the United States would be expelled, however, 
because such a move would be highly disruptive to world communications and self-destructive to 
INTELSAT. Other INTELSAT internal sanctions include restricting the offending party's rights to 
receive documentation concerning Assembly actions, vote, and be a member. Other sanctions are 
available against an offending signatory. See Certain Obligations, supra note 121, at 9-11, 16-18. 
169 Article XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 134. 
170 See Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 3. 
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the provisions of each individual proposal. I71 This section examines the criteria 
applied by the Assembly in making its findings. 
I. Technical Coordination 
A separate system that is coordinated with INTELSAT under Article XIV(d) 
must not interfere technically with the INTELSAT system. 172 The Board con-
ducts a detailed analysis of the potential interference of the separate system 
with the INTELSAT system. 173 The Board meets with planners of the separate 
system to examine and resolve technical problems identified by the analysis. 17' 
When the projected levels of interference are reduced to an acceptable level, 
the Board forwards a report on technical compatibility.175 
2. Significant Economic Harm 
Economic harm hinges on whether the proposed market is currently served 
by INTELSAT or could, within the life time of the proposed facilities, be 
included in the INTELSAT traffic base.I76 Services beyond international public 
telecommunications are outside the economic harm analysis. 177 Thus, the pro-
posed system must be examined under two standards: 1) those services dupli-
cative of INTELSAT international public telecommunications offerings; and 2) 
those services competing with planned INTELSAT offerings. 178 
a. Duplicative Offerings 
When a separate system's offerings are already available over INTELSAT, no 
significant economic harm is deemed present if the Board recommends that, 
for the most part, the proposed system's traffic would not have been routed 
171 For a detailed analysis of these criteria commissioned by INTELSAT, see Walter Hinchman 
Associates, Inc., Significant Economic Harm, Attachment No. I to INTELSAT Doc. BG-60-63E W/9/ 
84 (August IS, 1984). 
172 The language of Article XIV(d) places greater emphasis on technical compatibility than on 
economic harm. Article XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 134. 
173 See, e.g., Attachment No.5 to ARABSAT Coordination, supra note 94 (example of a technical 
Coordination). 
174 See ARABSAT Coordination, supra note 94, at 5. 
17S The demands of technical coordination are set out in INTELSAT documents BG-28-70 (Rev. I) 
and BG-43-7I, Addendum # I. 
176 See, e.g., Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97, at 8 ~ 14 (INTELSAT's prospects depend 
on its own state of readiness in the time period involved). See also Policies, Criteria and Procedures, 
supra note 84, at 14-15. 
177 See INTELSAT Agreements, Article XIV(c) and (e), supra note 119. See also supra text accom-
panying notes 126-30, 139-41. 
178 Both duplicative and planned services standards have been applied in previous coordinations. In 
the Transborder and ECS II coordinations some of the offerings were duplicative of services available 
over INTELSAT and some were similar to planned INTELSAT offerings. See ECS II Coordination, 
supra note 90, at 6-7; Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97, at 3, 8. 
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over INTELSAT.I79 Applicants have succeeded in proving their systems' traffic 
would not be carried by INTELSAT using two approaches. First, technical 
constraints are likely to keep the proposed traffic off the INTELSAT system 
for the separate system's useful life. ISO Second, economic realities arising from 
the nature of the proposed services effectively exclude such traffic from IN-
TELSAT's base. lSI 
1. Technical limitations 
The Transborder coordinations indicate that the Assembly must assess the 
technical feasibility of INTELSAT itself offering the proposed services along 
the proposed routes. IS2 In the PALAPA-A coordination, the Board recom-
mended that the system would not cause economic harm because, in part, 
technical hurdles made the use of the INTELSAT system unlikely.ls3 Thus, one 
technical limitation is the accessibility of INTELSAT facilities from various 
points on the earth. 
Another technical limitations consideration is the possibility an existing ter-
restrial network preempts INTELSAT's service to the proposed market. In the 
ARABSAT coordination, the Board found that, absent the proposed system, 
the traffic in question would be routed over terrestrial facilities. Is4 In the ECS 
I coordination, the Board found that existing terrestrial facilities and the short 
distances involved did not warrant satellite operation. ISS Thus, the Board found 
that significant economic harm did not exist because, in part, the traffic should 
not be routed via satellite. I86 Despite INTELSAT's offering of similar services 
over other routes, if INTELSAT was unlikely to carry the proposed services, 
the Assembly has recommended that separate systems be deemed not to cause 
significant economic harm.Is7 
ll. Economic limitations 
A second factor in an analysis of potentially duplicative markets is whether 
INTELSAT currently offers the services but at prohibitive costs. In the Trans-
border I coordination, the Board recognized that the routing of the proposed 
services through INTELSAT as well as the domestic systems would be econom-
ically unsound for the customers. I88 In the ECS I coordination the Board 
179 See, e.g., ARABSAT Coordination, supra note 94, at 6-7. 
180 See infra text accompanying notes 182-87. 
181 See infra text accompanying notes 188-90. 
182 See, e.g., Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97, at 6 ~ II. 
183 See PALAPA-A Coordination, supra note 93, at 2. 
184 See ARABSAT Coordination, supra note 94, at 6. 
185 See ECS I Coordination, supra note 88, at 6. 
186/d. C[ Article XIV(d) Consultation Concerning Potential Economic Harm To INTELSAT By 
The Planned Use Of The RCA SATCOM Satellite System By Bermuda, supra note 97, at 2. 
187 See generally Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 10-16. 
188 See, e.g., Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97, at 5. 
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recommended that, political incentives aside, it would not be economically useful 
to send the proposed traffic over INTELSAT or any satellite system. IB9 Where 
an INTELSAT market exists, but is latent due to prohibitive costs or inefficiency 
of using the INTELSAT system, a separate system is not deemed to cause 
significant economic harm.19o 
b. Planned Offerings 
With regard to separate systems proposing to carry services similar to planned 
INTELSAT offerings, the ECS coordinations indicate that the Board must first 
determine whether demand warrants an INTELSAT investment in the mar-
ket. 191 Even if INTELSAT has contractual commitments to offer the new service, 
the Transborder I coordinations indicate that the Assembly must evaluate 
whether such service will be implemented within the time period proposed by 
the applicant. 192 Should the applicant propose to implement a sophisticated 
service at an accelerated pace, the benefits of developing markets l93 and shifting 
of investment risks l94 make such service acceptable to INTELSAT within the 
economic harm analysis. 195 
3. Prejudice to Direct Communications Links 
Article XIV(d) also demands that the Assembly make recommendations "re-
garding the assurance that the provision or utilization of such [separate] facilities 
shall not prejudice the establishment of direct telecommunications links through 
the INTELSAT space segment among all the participants."196 In a 1984 mem-
orandum to the Board of Directors, INTELSAT Legal Advisor David M. Leive 
asserted that the links language protects the rights of INTELSAT participants 
189 See ECS I Coordination, supra note 88, at 6. 
190 See generally Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 12-14. 
191 See, e.g., ECS II Coordination, supra note 90, at 8 ~ 12. 
192 See, e.g., Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97, at 5-6. 
193 The ECS II coordination reveals INTELSAT reasoning that early implementation of digital 
business service "could assist INTELSAT by developing a readily identifiable market." See Policies, 
Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 34 ~~ 3(a) & (b). 
194 INTELSAT believed the services proposed in the ECS II coordination were short-term and risky 
due to the development of the terrestrial ISDN in Europe and the growth of direct broadcast television. 
Thus, the ECS system would bear the risk of the failure of the satellite digital business and satellite 
point to point TV services markets in Europe. See Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 
34. 
195 This assumes INTELSAT may set a time limit on the service offered so as to preserve its long 
term economic interest. INTELSAT has set time limitations on separate systems in previous coordi-
nations. See, e.g., ECS I Coordination, supra note 88, at 8. 
196 Article XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 134. 
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to communicate directly with each other. 197 In a separate memorandum IN-
TELSAT Director General Richard R. Colino recommended that the direct 
links protection be interpreted to apply to financial, operational or technical 
effects of alternative systems. 198 Under the Colino interpretation, should a pro-
posed system hamper universal connectivity by causing price variations, it would 
not pass the links test. 199 
In opening remarks to the Definitive Arrangements negotiations, U.S. Am-
bassador Abbott Washburn warned against mounting two or more mutually 
exclusive satellite systems.200 In proposing the direct links language, the Japa-
nese delegation supported smaller regional systems as long as they did not 
compete with INTELSAT and did not interfere with "direct communications 
with other nations through the INTELSAT system."201 Taken in the context of 
Washburn's warnings, Japan was concerned that its support of non-INTELSAT 
regional systems would be taken as a threat to the existing INTELSAT routes 
and the expansion of INTELSAT to new members.202 The direct links provision 
was intended to avert possible mutually exclusive systems and to insure that 
systems coordinated under Article XIV (d) would not technically or politically 
interfere with INTELSAT or its growth.203 
V. THEORIES OF ARTICLE XIV(d) COORDINATION 
Article XIV coordination begins with a member country's submission to IN-
TELSAT of a notice of intention to use a separate satellite system.204 The 
197 D. Leive. Legal Memorandum, Scope of the Article XIV(d) Assurance Concerning "Direct Te-
lecommunications Links," Attachment No. I to INTELSAT Doc. BG-60-61E W/9/84 (August 15. 1984) 
at 9. The Leive memorandum suggests that a proposed separate system that restricts its members 
from using INTELSAT facilities would be violative of the links language. /d. at 6. In the previous 
Article XIV(d) coordinations the services proposed engendered no prejudice to direct communications 
links. But see AlgeriaiINTERSPUTNIK Coordination, supra note 96, at 6 (a type of problem that might 
impose such a threat). 
198 See Policies. Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 21. 
199/d. at 22. The applicants reacted to the Director General's proposals with understandable ire. See, 
e.g .• Letter from Cygnus to Mr. Glenn deC habert, Federal Communications Commission Common 
Carrier Bureau, September 6. 1984 (on file with at the F.C.C. with the Cygnus Application, supra note 
I). 
200 See Statement by the Representative of France. INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com 1196 at 3. 
201 See Statement by the Representative of Japan, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com IISRl5 at 
6. See also Statement by the Representative of Japan, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I/SRl11 
at :l (concern is with technical interference posed by regional systems). See generally Leive, supra note 
197, at 2-3. 
202 See INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com IISRl5 (discussion of services properly offered by 
INTELSAT). 
203 To read the links language as setting up economic hurdles to separate systems would render the 
significant economic harm language surplusage. A more likely reading would apply links protections 
to separate systems serving non-INTELSAT routes because the technical and economic protections 
found in Article XIV (d) only go to the existing or planned INTELSAT traffic. Thus the links language 
would insure against exclusive non-INTELSAT systems. 
204 Article XIV(d). INTELSAT Agreements. supra note 134. 
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submission states the member's intention to use a separate international system 
and presents information regarding the technical and economic effects on 
INTELSAT of such a system.205 If the system would have significant adverse 
impact on INTELSAT, the Assembly may recommend that it not be used.206 
Because there is little disagreement over the need for technical compatibility 
between INTELSAT and the proposed separate systems, this section examines 
the applicants' and the SIG's proposed interpretations of Article XIV require-
ments for economic coordination.207 
Against the backdrop of the INTELSAT Agreement's economic protection-
ism,208 the proponents of separate systems have advanced three interpretations 
of the economic demands of Article XIV. First, Orion and Cygnus argue that 
their systems will not generate significant economic harm to INTELSAT because 
the systems will not offer international public telecommunications services.209 
Second, lSI, RCA Americom, and PanAmSat argue that their systems will divert 
only a small portion of INTELSA T's traffic and thus will not cause significant 
economic harm.21o Third, a letter from Secretaries George P. Shultz and Mal-
comb Baldrige to F.C.C. Chairman Mark S. Fowler asserts that separate systems 
restricted from carrying public-switched message network traffic will meet the 
economic obligations imposed by Article XIV.211 
A. Specialized Telecommunications Services 
1. Orion/Cygnus Position 
Orion and Cygnus assert that their proposals do not fall under Article XIV(d) 
because their user-dedicated offerings are distinguishable from international 
public telecommunications services.212 Rather, they urge that their applications 
should be considered under the contingency provisions of Article XIV(e) which 
require only technical compatibility.213 Orion proposes to sell or lease transpon-
205 See supra notes 150 & 173 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 155-57. 
207 All parties agree that the u.s. proposed separate systems must not technically interfere with the 
INTELSAT system. See Orion Application, supra note I, at 11-5; lSI Application, supra note I, at 62-
63 & Appendix C; RCA Americom Application, supra note I, at Attachment 2; Cygnus Application, 
supra note I, at 66-68; PanAmSat Application, supra note I, at 78; SIG Report, supra note 2, at 17. 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 134-38. 
209 See Opposition to Petition to Deny 11-14, In re Orion Satellite Corporation, File No. CSS-83-
002-P (April 28, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Orion Opposition]; Consolidated Opposition to Petition 
to Deny and Reply to Comments 11-15, In re Cygnus Satellite Corporation, File No. CSS-84-002-
P(LA) (April 26, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Cygnus Opposition]. 
210 See lSI Application, supra note I, at 48-56; PanAmSat Application, supra note I, at 42; RCA 
Americom Application, supra note I, at 15. 
211 See SIG Letter, supra note 6 (suggesting criteria for F.C.C. approval of separate systems). 
212 Orion Application, supra note I, at 1-8, Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 64-65. 
213 Orion Application, supra note I, at 1-8, Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 65. See supra text 
accompanying notes 134-41 (demands of Article XIV(d) and (e)). 
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der capacity to selected multi-national corporations in need of CONUSlWestern 
European service.214 Cygnus intends to make its facility available under eco-
nomic arrangements similar to Orion's proposal and vows to take precautions 
against its clients using the system to transmit public switched message traffic.2I5 
Orion and Cygnus contemplate that their facilities would be used for data 
transmission and video distribution.216 They rely on the economic nature of 
their offerings to distinguish them from the international public telecommun-
ications services regulated by Article XIV(d).217 
Under the Orion/Cygnus definition of public telecommunications, the eco-
nomic harm analysis found in Article XIV(d) does not apply to their proposals 
because their systems would not offer "international public telecommunications 
services."218 In order to substantiate their interpretations, Orion and Cygnus 
equate the INTELSAT Agreement's "public telecommunications" definition 
with the F.C.C. definition for common carriage.219 They argue that because 
their proposals contemplate only the sale or long-term lease of transponder 
capacity to private entities, their services are neither common-carrier offerings 
nor international public telecommunications.22o 
2. COMSAT/INTELSAT Position 
COMSAT and INTELSAT challenge the Orion/Cygnus definition of public 
telecommunications. First, COMSAT charges that the scope of international 
public telecommunications is broader than the Orion/Cygnus interpretation.221 
COMSAT argues that public telecommunications services are defined by the 
nature of their use and not the economic arrangements.222 Further, in response 
to the argument that leased circuits are private user-dedicated services, INTEL-
SAT argues that the phrase "international public telecommunications" expressly 
contemplates the offerings of Orion and Cygnus.223 Finally, COMSAT points to 
214 Orion Application, supra note 1, at 1-9-1-10. 
215 Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 64-65. 
216 Orion Application, supra note I, at 1I-34-1I-35; Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 17. 
217 See Orion Opposition, supra note 209, at 28-29. 
218 Id.; Cygnus Opposition, supra note 209, at 13. 
219 Orion Opposition, supra note 209, at 17-29; Cygnus Opposition, supra note 209, at 12-13. 
220 Orion Application, supra note I, at 1-8; Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 65. 
221 Reply Of Communications Satellite Corporation To Opposition To Petition To Deny 5-7, In re 
Orion Satellite Corporation, File No. CSS-83-002-P (May 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as COMSAT 
Reply to Orion]; Petition To Deny Of Communications Satellite Corporation 8, In re Application of 
Cygnus Satellite Corporation, File No. CSS-84-002-P(LA) (April 13, 1984) [hereinafter cited as COM-
SAT Petition to Deny Cygnus]. 
222 See, e.g., COMSAT Reply to Orion, supra note 221, at 9. 
223 Article I(k), INTELSAT Agreements, infra note 232 (full text). See Hearings before the House 
Subcomm., supra note 2, at 624-25, Legal Opinion On the Scope Of Intelsat's "Public Telecommuni-
cations Services" (attachment to Alper written statement). INTELSAT asserts that at the time of the 
Definitive Arrangements' negotiation there was little distinction between public and private facilities. 
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the coordination of domestic private facilities as public telecommunications 
under Article XIV(c) as an indication that such services are not specialized 
services.224 
In addition to disputing the public versus private distinction, COMSAT chal-
lenges the equation of public telecommunications services with common carrier 
offerings.225 COMSAT argues that the distinction between private user-dedi-
cated and common carrier facilities is incorrect because many private services 
are offered by common carriers.226 Further, COMSAT asserts that U.S. domestic 
definitions such as common carriage are not binding on international agree-
ments.227 
3. SIG Position 
As did COMSAT, the Department of State rejected the Orion and Cygnus 
public versus private distinction as a basis for avoiding the Article XIV(d) 
determination of economic harm. 228 The Department of State Legal Advisor 
noted that rules of international agreement interpretation do not support the 
equation of public telecommunications with common carriage.229 The Legal 
Advisor reasoned that a reading of the INTELSAT Agreements which would 
allow the establishment of separate systems regardless of economic harm to 
INTELSAT runs "counter to the object and purpose of the Agreement."23o The 
Legal Advisor concluded that both the Orion and lSI proposals fall outside the 
definition of specialized services.231 
See Hearings beJore the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 207 (Colino responses to additional questions 
submitted for the record). 
224 COMSAT Reply to Orion, supra note 221, at 7-8 n.14. 
225 [d. at 7; COMSAT Petition to Deny Cygnus, supra note 221, at 8. 
226 COMSAT Reply to Orion, supra note 221, at 6. 
227 [d. at 7; COMSAT Petition to Deny Cygnus, supra note 221, at 8. 
228 See D. Robinson, U.S. Dep't of State, Memorandum of Law, The Orion Satellite Corporation and 
International Satellite, Inc. Applications for International Satellite Communications Facilities 3-6 
(November 28, 1984) (attached to SIC letter, supra note 6). The Department of State analysis was 
initiated before Cygnus, RCA Americom, and PanAmSat made application to the F.C.C., therefore, it 
addresses only the Orion and lSI proposals. 
229 [d. at 3-4. 
230 [d. at 6. 
231 [d. at 7-8. The Department of State memorandum analyzed the Orion and lSI Applications in 
four parts. First, all international public telecommunications satellite systems separate from INTELSAT 
must be coordinated for technical interference and economic harm. Second, the INTELSAT Agree-
ments' "public telecommunications services" do not equate with F.e.C. "common carrier services." 
Third, the Orion and lSI proposals do not contemplate truly private non-commercial services. Finally, 
the INTELSAT Agreements' "specialized services" provisions were not intended to include the types 
of systems proposed by Orion and lSI. See ARABSAT Coordination, supra note 94, at 4 (ARABSAT 
direct broadcast services as an example of specialized services coordination). 
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4. Analysis 
The issue of whether private facilities may avoid meeting the economic criteria 
of coordination with INTELSAT turns on the definition of "public telecom-
munications services"232 and the nature of the services proposed. The original 
distinction between public and specialized telecommunications grew out of a 
dispute at the Definitive Arrangements negotiations concerning the services 
which could be provided by INTELSAT without the approval of the Assembly 
of Parties.233 While the United States wished to insure heavy use of the INTEL-
SAT system by including all possible satellite services in its mandate,234 devel-
oping countries feared that the inclusion of sophisticated services would tax the 
financial resources of the system.235 A compromise resulted in the Article XIV(d) 
economic protections applying to INTELSAT's primary concern, international 
public telecommunications as defined in Articles I(k) and III(a) & (b).236 Services 
outside INTELSAT's public scope could be provided, but only after approval 
of the Assembly of Parties under Article III(d), (e) & (f).237 
The debate over this distinction revealed a number of considerations in 
determining whether a service is public or specialized. In negotiating the public 
versus specialized distinction found in Articles I, III, and XIV, the delegates to 
the plenipotentiary conferences were concerned with protecting INTELSAT's 
232 Article I(k) defines public telecommunications services as 
... fixed or mobile telecommunications services which can be provided by satellite and which 
are available for use by the public such as telephony, telegraphy, telex, facsimile, data trans-
mission, transmission of radio and television programs between approved earth stations 
having access to the INTELSAT space segment for further transmission to the public, leased 
circuits for any of these purposes; but excluding those mobile services ... which are provided 
through mobile stations operating directly to a satellite which is designed in whole or in part 
to provide services relating to safety or flight control of aircraft or to aviation or maritime 
radio navigation. 
Article I(k), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3816-17. 
Article 1(1) defines specialized telecommunications services as 
... telecommunications services which can be provided by satellite, other than those defined 
in paragraph (k) of the Article, including, but not limited to, radio navigation services, 
broadcasting satellite services for reception by the general public, space research services, 
meteorological services, and earth resources services. 
Article 1(1), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813,3817. 
Those services which might be offered under INTELSAT's prime objective are defined in Article 
I(k) as public telecommunications services. See Hearings before the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 
206-07 (Colino statement). Those which were not within INTELSAT's primary scope must be specif-
ically approved by the Assembly of Parties as specialized telecommunications services prior to being 
offered by INTELSAT. Article VII(c)(iv), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 
3825. 
233 See GALLOWAY, supra note 18, at 162-63. 
234 See COLI NO, Monograph, supra note 3, at 100. 
235 ld. at 10 1. 
236 See Article I(k), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 232; Article III(a) & (b), INTELSAT Agree-
ments, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3819. 
237 Article III(d), (e) & (f), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 10,23 U.S.T. 3813, 3820-22. 
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economic health.238 The delegates saw two potential threats to INTELSAT's 
economic health: I) competition from separate systems;239 and 2) specialized 
services offered by INTELSAT that might tax INTELSAT's financial base to 
the benefit of only a few member countries.240 The delegates to the negotiations 
considered specialized services such as direct broadcast satellites and aeronaut-
ical and maritime navigational facilities to be outside those provided by telecom-
munications entities.241 Specialized services were those the delegates considered 
not commercially practicable for INTELSAT to carry.242 Conversely, interna-
tional public services are those currently offered or planned by INTELSAT 
signatories. 
The delegates designed the Definitive Arrangements to guard against per-
ceived economic threats by INTELSAT. Members' use of systems competing 
with INTELSAT was inhibited through Articles I(k) and XIV(d).243 Addition 
of services that might otherwise burden the INTELSA T system was inhibited 
by Articles I(l) and IIJ.244 In sum, the negotiating history of the Definitive 
Arrangements indicates that proposed separate systems will be subject to con-
sideration of Article XIV(d) economic parameters if the systems would offer 
services in competition with those available through INTELSAT signatories.245 
B. Market Diversion Theory 
lSI, RCA Americom, and PanAmSat assert that, as measured by a diversion 
of traffic or revenues from the INTELSAT system, their systems would not 
23. See Main Points Expressed in Committee 1's Discussion of the Rights and Obligations of Members 
and the Relationship with the lTV, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com 11107 (Rev. 1) (agreement 
that members should not participate in competing systems, disagreement over whether separate 
regional systems were permissible). See also COLINa, Monograph, supra note 3, at 100-01. 
239 See, e.g., Statement by the Representative of India, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I/SRI 
3 at 4; see also Statement by the Representative of Japan, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I/SRI 
5 at 6; but see Statement by the Representative of France, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I/SRI 
11 at 2 (separate regional systems linking INTELSAT and non-INTELSAT systems may be beneficial). 
240 See Statement by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, INTELSAT Travaux 
Preparatoires Com 1132 at 1-2 (discussing the financial arrangements for the provision of specialized 
services). 
241 See Statement By The Delegate Of Sweden Concerning Draft Article III At The Ninth Session, 
May 22, 1970, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires IWGlDoc. 16 ("Telecommunications entities, the 
prospective 'Signatories; are not users of specialized services."). 
242 See Specialised Telecommunications Services: Inter-Relationship Of Article 3 Of The Operating 
Agreement And Articles I(k) And III(f) Of The Inter·Governmental Agreement, Submitted by the 
Delegation of the Vnited Kingdom, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Doc. 226, May 15, 1971 (spe-
cialized services are those which INTELSAT has not provided). 
243 Articles I(k) & XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra notes 232 & 134. 
244 Id.; Articles I(l) & III(d), (e), and (f), INTELSAT Agreements, supra notes 232 & 237. 
245 Orion and Cygnus admit that part of the proposed services are in competition with INTELSAT 
offerings when they argue price elasticity as a basis for approval. See, e.g., Cygnus Application, supra 
note I, at 60-61. 
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cause significant economic harm to INTELSAT.246 These proposals advance 
three theories concerning the avoidance of economic harm: 1) the proposed 
system will only cause a de minimus diversion of traffic;247 2) the existence of 
unmet demand or untapped markets will insulate INTELSAT from economic 
harm;248 and 3) the continuance of international communications satellite mar-
ket growth will provide enough traffic for both a separate system and a healthy 
INTELSAT.249 
1. Applicants' Position 
a. De Minimus Diversion 
lSI estimates that it will divert just over three percent of INTELSA T's traffic 
during a five to seven year period.250 This diversion, according to lSI, is not 
significant considering INTELSAT's expected growth and present economic 
health.251 The lSI analysis is based on assertions that little public-switched 
message service traffic will be diverted from INTELSAT to its system.252 lSI 
claims that its principle customers will be the audio and video distribution and 
high-speed data transmission markets.253 lSI claims that its forbearance of cur-
rent INTELSAT public-switched message traffic and a new range of developing 
markets spurred by competition will insulate INTELSAT from significant eco-
nomic harm.254 This argument is echoed by other applicants.255 
A variation on the de minimus diversion argument is found in the RCA 
Americom and PanAmSat proposals.256 This version argues that limited tran-
246 lSI Application, supra note 1, at 56; RCA Americom Application, supra note I, at 15; Pan 
American Satellite Corporation's Combined Opposition To Petition To Deny Filed By ComSat And 
Response To Comments Filed By AT&T and Digital Telesat, Inc. Appendix B at 13, In re Pan 
American Satellite Corporation, File No. CSS-84-004-P(LA) (August 27, 1984) [hereinafter cited as 
PanAmSat Opposition). See also Cygnus Application, supra note 1, at 70-71 (secondary argument). 
247 See, e.g., lSI Application, supra note I, at 58. 
248 See, e.g., PanAmSat Opposition, supra note 246, Appendix B at 16 (economic harm as measured 
by diversion of INTELSAT traffic). 
249 See, e.g., lSI Application, supra note I, at 56. 
250Id. at Appendix F at 15. 
251 Id. at 56-58. 
252Id. at 53-54. COMSAT vigorously contested the lSI estimates in its Petition To Deny, but relied 
on attacking the bases of lSI estimation rather than asserting its own economic analysis. Petition to 
Deny of Communications Satellite Corporation 9, In Re International Satellite, Inc., File Nos. CSS-
83-004-P(LA), I-P-C-83-073 (September 19, 1983) [hereinafter cited as COMSAT Petition to Deny 
lSI). 
253 lSI Application, supra note 1, at 6. 
254 Id. at 48,51-52. 
255 See, e.g., Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 61-62. 
256 RCA Americom Application, supra note 1, at 2 (six transponders); PanAmSat Opposition; supra 
note 246, Appendix B at 13 (12 or less transponders). A transponder is the device on the satellite that 
receives, amplifies, and transmits the signal. See BELENDIUK & ROBB, supra note 6, at 47. Each tran-
1986] INTELSAT 227 
sponder capacity will constitute a lesser threat to INTELSAT than mounting 
full-scale separate systems. 257 Here the applicants rely on the limited interna-
tional capacities of their systems as insurance against economic harm to IN-
TELSAT and thus seek to satisfy Article XIV(d). 
b. Untapped Markets 
All the applicants assert that untapped markets or unmet demand will provide 
the traffic to support their systems. 25H Under this theory, alternative systems 
offering less expensive and more flexible services will attract those potential 
users inhibited by INTELSAT price and service restrictions. 2s9 Thus, new ser-
vices and competition will spur an expanded demand and therefore spare 
INTELSAT from incurring significant economic harm. 26() 
c. Market Growth 
The projected growth of U.S. demand for international communications 
services is the third factor and panacea for the separate systems' economic 
threat to INTELSAT.26! lSI asserts that INTELSAT may expect an annual 
compounded service growth rate of approximately 16 percent.262 Thus, the 
argument states, diversion of a portion of such growth would not constitute 
significant economic harm to INTELSAT.263 
2. COMSAT/INTELSAT Response 
COMSAT contends that the capacity of the proposed system and its planned 
routing, not its targeted markets, are the telling indicators of economic harm.264 
sponder has a limited capacity. !d. Therefore, the number of transponders dedicated to any group of 
routes limits that total traffic over those routes for that satellite. 
257 See, e.g., RCA Americom Application, supra note I, at 2 
258 See, e.g., lSI Application, supra note I, at 27-28; Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 71-73. 
259 lSI Application, supra note I, at 35; Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 71. 
260 As of this writing the applicants had yet to prove the existence of the latent markets. See K. 
Dunmore, Dale N. Hatfield Associates, Issues In International Telecommunication Telecommunica-
tions Pricing And Demand at 35-38 (:\lovember 27, 1984) (on file at the F.C.C. with Orion Application, 
supra note I) [hereinafter cited as Pricing and Demand] (general assertions on the existence of 
international markets outside the INTELSAT traffic base prepared for Orion). While the applications 
are replete with references to the benefits of competition in the international communications satellite 
marketplace, domestic experience is not so rosy. See Comment, International Regulation oJ Digital Com-
munications Satellite Systems, 32 FED. COM. L..J. 393, 398 (early marketing of Satellite Business Systems 
capacity failed to secure more than five customers). 
261 See Dunmore, Pricing and Demand, supra note 260, at 39. 
262 lSI Application, supra note I, at 57. 
263Id. at 58. 
264 Reply Of Communications Satellite Corporation To Opposition To Petition To Deny at 7-8, In 
re International Satellite, Inc., File Nos. CSS-83-004-P(LA), I-P-C-83-073 (October 24, 1983) [herein-
after cited as COMSAT Reply to lSI]. 
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Under the COMSAT analysis the proposed systems are especially threatening 
due to the fact that they could carry much of INTELSAT's present transatlantic 
traffic.265 COMSAT argues that even the limited RCA Americom and PanAmSat 
proposals carry sufficient capacity to cause economic harm to INTELSAT.266 
In addition to rejecting the use of the proposed systems' estimated diversion 
oftraffic as the indicator of economic harm to INTELSAT, COMSAT challenges 
the untapped market theory by asking for examples of the untapped market 
class.267 INTELSAT contends that it performs extensive research into the needs 
of its users and is unaware of any unmet demand.268 COMSAT also denies that 
market growth will exceed the traffic diverted by the proposed alternative 
systems.269 COM SAT's statistics indicate that the INTELSAT growth rate has 
dropped dramatically over the last two years. 270 
3. Analysis 
The theories for economic coordination with INTELSAT as presented by the 
applicants are threefold: de minimus diversion, untapped markets, and market 
growth. Furthermore, each of these arguments rests on the critical assumptions 
concerning: 1) the scope of Article XIV(d) protections;271 2) the time period to 
which these protections apply;272 and 3) assessment of the proposed systems 
individually as opposed to their cumulative effect on INTELSAT. 
a. INTELSAT's Scope 
The applicants argue generally that their systems will not cause economic 
harm to INTELSAT due to distinguishing characteristics in either their facilities 
or pricing structure.273 The applicants argue that INTELSAT is an economically 
265 [d. 
266 Petition To Deny Of Communications Satellite Corporation at 6, In re RCA American Commu-
nications, Inc., File Nos. 909-DSS-MP-84, I-T-C-84-085 (April 2, 1984) [hereinafter cited as COMSAT 
Petition to Deny RCA Americom]; Petition To Deny Of Communications Satellite Corporation at 14, 
In re Pan American Satellite Corporation, File No. CSS-84-004-P(LA) (july 13, 1984) [hereinafter 
cited as COMSAT Petition to Deny PanAmSat]. 
267 See, e.g., COMSAT Reply to lSI, supra note 264, at 8. 
268 See Hearings before the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 151-52 (Colino statement). But see 
PanAmSat Opposition, supra note 246, Appendix B at 16-17; RCA Americom Application, supra note 
I, at 2. 
269 COMSAT Reply to lSI, supra note 284, at 6. 
27U Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 614-15 (Alper written statement). 
27I Article XIV (d) protections apply only to international public telecommunications services as 
defined in Article I(k). The issue, therefore, is the scope of such services as defined by Article I(k). 
272 The INTELSAT Agreements are silent as to the length of time the Article XIV (d) protections 
apply. 
273 See Orion Application, supra note I, at 1-4 (user-dedicated facilities); lSI Application, supra note 
I, at 10 (unique technical and business characteristics); PanAmSat Opposition, supra note 246, Appen-
dix B at 6 (subregional video and audio transmission). 
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mature corporation, which can withstand the introduction of competition.274 
Further, the applicants assert that market growth, spurred by competition, will 
insulate INTELSAT from any negative effects caused by the introduction of 
the competition.275 This assertion incorporates the assumption that Article 
XIV(d) protections only apply to existing INTELSAT traffic levels as defined 
by market forces. 276 If markets are latent due to deficiencies in INTELSAT 
offerings, then those markets should not be INTELSAT's primary concern.277 
Although shying away from the term,278 INTELSAT views itself as a natural 
monopoly.279 INTELSAT points to its mandate to serve all nations on a non-
discriminatory basis280 as ground for a broad interpretation of its primary 
responsibility.281 Under such an interpretation, all traffic demands serviceable 
by INTELSAT must be routed through its system in order to insure economy 
of scale, the benefits of which are applied to the thin routes of developing 
countries.282 Thus, INTELSAT makes the assumption that Article XIV(d) pro-
tections apply to all commercial satellite telecommunications between accessible 
countries.283 
b. Time Period for Economic Protections 
Under the market diversion theory, the effect of a proposed system on 
INTELSAT is to be evaluated by estimating the potential diversion of present 
INTELSAT traffic. 284 As stated by lSI, "markets not served or services not 
provided by INTELSAT or on facility or other plans that INTELSAT has not 
implemented" need not be considered.285 Thus, the applicants assume an im-
mediate time period for determining economic harm. 
271 The mature corporation argument reasons that because INTELSAT has succeeded. it is less 
vulnerable to economic harm from competition in those markets outside its present traffic base. lSI 
Application. supra note I, at .56~5H. 
275 See id. at 52. 
276Id. at 51. 
277 See, e.g., Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 70~74. 
27< See Hearings before the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 77~78 (Coli no written statement). 
279 See SNOW, sulna note 25, at 99~101. See also ROSTOW REPORT, supra note 38, Chapter Two at 25~ 
26. 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 77~80. 
2"' See Hearings before the Senate Subcomm .. supra note IS, at 83~84 (Colino written statement). 
2He /d. at 195 (Colino responses to additional questions submitted for the record). 
283 Support for this assumption is found in the INTELSAT negotiating history in the debate over 
what constituted specialized as opposed to public services. See Statement By The Delegate Of Sweden 
Concerning Draft Article III At The Ninth Session, May 22, 1970, INTELSAT Travaux Preparataires 
IWGlDoc. 16. 
284 See, e.g., RCA Americom Application, supra note I, at 2. This means of evaluation is present in 
all arguments of untapped markets or market growth as protections against economic harm. The basis 
of the argument is that INTELSAT's future trallie is relative to its present traffic and separate systems 
will not engender significant economic harm. 
285 lSI Application, supra note I, at 52. lSI did perf{>rm its economic harm analysis over a five to 
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INTELSAT argues that the economic harm analysis applies to all services 
proposed by the applicants because these services are already within its market 
base.286 While INTELSAT nonpublic-switched message traffic is presently light, 
INTELSAT asserts that its entry into these markets entails Article XIV(d) 
protections.287 Thus, INTELSAT argues that its expected growth should be 
included in its protected traffic base.288 This argument incorporates an assump-
tion that the significant economic harm analysis applies to present as well as 
future traffic. 
c. Cumulative Effect 
The market diversion theory assumes that only a single alternative system 
will be taken into account when determining the effect on INTELSAT traffic 
and revenues.289 Support for this assumption is found in the F.C.C.'s case-by-
case approach to previous alternative systems applications.29o Thus, the appli-
cants seek to have the economic effects of their systems weighed separately. 
COMSAT and INTELSAT argue that the applicants' proposals must be con-
sidered in their cumulative effect on INTELSAT.291 They argue that the United 
States' approval of separate intercontinental systems would signal other coun-
tries also to establish separate systems, thereby having a greater economic impact 
on INTELSAT than a single system or the U.S. systems alone.292 Pointing to its 
coordination of the Algeria/INTERSPUTNIK proposals as precedent, INTEL-
SAT argues that the cumulative effect of the proposals is the true basis for the 
determination of economic harm.29:l COMSAT points out that the creation of 
the present U.S. proposed alternative systems, excluding similar actions by other 
parties, would almost triple the transponder capacity for existing INTELSAT 
transatlantic routes. 294 
seven-year time period. See id. at 56. The lSI estimates, however, are based on present INTELSAT 
offerings and technology, thus the lSI estimates of economic harm are relative to the present, and 
then indexed to estimated growth. See id. at Appendix F. 
286 See Hearings beJore the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 151-52 (Colino statement). 
287 !d. at 83-86 (Colino written statement) (future INTELSA T viability depends on new services to 
broaden its revenue base). 
288 Id. at 59-60. 
289 See, e.g., RCA Americom Application, supra note I, at 2; lSI Application, supra note 1, Appendix 
F at 1. Further, PanAmSat argues that the planning of alternative systems by parties other than the 
United States is evidence that its proposal should be approved. See PanAmSat Opposition, supra note 
246, at 4-6. 
,gO See, e.g., Trausborder, 88 F.C.C.2d 258 (1981). 
'91 See Hearings beJore the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 193 (Coli no responses to additional 
questions submitted for the record). See, e.g., COMSAT Petition to Deny lSI, supra note 252, at 12. 
292 See, e.g., COMSAT Petition to Deny lSI, supra note 252, at 14. See generally Hearings beJore the 
House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 364-68 (Statement of Rep. Dingell). 
'93 See Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 11-12. 
294 See Hearings beJore the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 601 (Alper statement). 
1986] INTELSAT 231 
The cumulative effect issue incorporates many considerations beyond the 
merits of the proposals. A number of regional systems in the planning stages 
would have the capability to serve the United States should the F.C.C. authorize 
the use of non-INTELSAT space segment for international purposes.295 Fur-
ther, considerations of orbital slot availability,296 potential duplicative service,297 
and additional proposed alternative systems298 all must be weighed in examining 
the effect of establishing non-INTELSAT systems. 
4. Summary 
The various assertions under market diversion theory rest on assumptions 
that the scope of Article XIV(d) protections are limited to present INTELSAT 
offerings299 and traffic300 and are applied to each proposal separately.301 COM-
SAT and INTELSAT's response rests on assumptions that Article XIV(d) pro-
tections apply to all communications markets serviceable by international sat-
ellite facilities302 and traffic within those markets. 3D3 Further, COMSAT and 
INTELSAT argue that the magnitude of economic harm threatened by separate 
systems is to be weighed cumulatively.3D4 
295 See PanAmSat Opposition, supra note 246, at 5. 
296 At present, only a limited number of satellites may operate in geostationary orbit without inter-
fering with each other. Therefore, orbital positions or slots are a scarce resource. Viewed from the 
orbital slot and frequency spectrum perspective, the main barrier to alternative systems is political 
rather than technical. A report released in March, 1983, indicates the geostationary orbit capacity is 
far beyond the foreseeable demand for world-wide telecommunications use. See N.T.I.A., LONG RANGE 
GOALS, supra note 105, at 104-06. The process for allocation of orbital slots, however, is a first-come 
first-served basis as coordinated through the ITU. See id. at 103-04. Some countries believe that orbital 
slots should be allocated on a future use a priori basis. See SIG Report, supra note 2, at 22-24; Hearings 
before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 607 (Alper statement). Thus, politically, some argue it is 
improper for the United States to appropriate geostationary slots on a unilateral or bilateral basis. /d. 
297 From an efficiency standpoint, the use of non-INTELSAT systems for duplicative services has 
been frowned upon by the United States. See Transborder, 88 F.C.C.2d at 281 n. 30. In the Transborder 
cases the F.C.C. based its approval of the use of domestic satellites for U.S.lCanada service on the 
inefficiency of duplicative services. Id. at 281. If the untapped markets fail to materialize multiple 
alternative systems would constitute inefficient use of the geostationary orbit and frequency spectrum. 
See ROSTOW REPORT, supra note 38, Chapter Two at 25. 
298 Venture capital markets will probably limit the U.S. mounting of $250 million systems. This 
private enterprise limit, however, is no barrier to alternative systems underwritten by foreign Post, 
Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) Authorities. The history of INTELSAT is full of promised alternative 
systems to be mounted by PTT's for nationalistic purposes. See Trooboff, supra note 26, at 13-14. 
The principal disincentive to these alternatives systems was the United States support of the single 
global system concept. 
299 See supra text accompanying notes 273-76. 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 284-85. 
301 See supra text accompanying notes 289-90. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 278-83. 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 306-08. 
304 See supra text accompanying notes 291-94. 
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C. Market Division Theory 
1. SIG Proposal 
The SIG recommended that the permissibility of separate systems be condi-
tioned upon a restriction that such systems provide only customized services.305 
The SIG Report states that significant economic harm to INTELSAT may be 
avoided if the separate systems are precluded from carrying traffic originating 
in public-switched message networks.306 The SIG recommendations are a hybrid 
of the percentage diversion theory, asserting that Article XIV protections will 
be met because the diversion of non public-switched message traffic will not 
cause significant economic harm.307 
The SIG asserts that over 80 percent of INTELSA T's traffic arises from 
public-switched message networks.30s Further, the SIG projects an annual 
growth rate of close to 15 percent for this traffic over the 1988-2000 time 
period.3og The combination of these factors, the SIG Report states, will insulate 
INTELSAT from economic harm. 3lo This analysis is also found in the lSI offer 
to forgo traffic now carried by A.T.& T.3ll and in the Cygnus intent to preclude 
use of its proposed system for common carrier purposes.312 
2. COMSAT/INTELSAT Position 
COMSAT and INTELSAT respond by restating the issue of whether protec-
tion of INTELSAT public-switched message traffic insulates against significant 
economic harm as, simply, whether the INTELSAT system is capable of carrying 
'05 SIG Report, supra note 2, at 30. The SIG Report does not clearly define customized services 
beyond such services involving "the sale or long-term lease of transponders or space segment capacity" 
for services including intracorporate networks, television transmission, and emergency restoration 
services. [d. 
306/d. 
'07 /d.; see also lSI Application, supra note 1, at 54; Cygnus Application, supra note 1, at 31. 
'08 SIG Report, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
'09 [d. at 8. 
310/d. at 35. The SIG Report outlines three potential scenarios resulting in significant economic 
harm to INTELSAT: 
Since public-switched services comprise by far the largest part of international traffic, any 
significant adverse impact on INTELSAT could result only if: (i) customized communications 
quickly supplant conventional services as the mainstay of the international communications 
business; (ii) such new services constitute a uniquely profitable line of commerce, the profits 
from which are essential to subsidize other necessary but unprofitable INTELSAT undertak-
ings; and (iii) INTELSAT proves unable effectively to match new entrants. by. among other 
things. achieving end-user price reductions. broadening its service repertoire, and providing 
carriers and users direct access options. 
/d. at 34. 
311 lSI Application. supra note I. at 54. 
312 Cygnus Application. supra note 1. at 65. 68-74. 
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customized services such as international television and business services.313 
Thus, they argue, the consideration of potential economic harm to INTELSAT 
must extend beyond the confines of the INTELSAT public-switched message 
traffic base.314 Further, INTELSAT has cautioned that the separate systems 
constitute a real threat to the viability of its fledgling business service offerings.315 
COMSAT further asserts that any protection of INTELSAT's interests based 
on a public-switched message traffic preclusion would not be enforceable by 
either the applicants3I6 or the F.C.C.m COM SAT points out that many com-
panies have their own telephone switching equipment allowing them to connect 
local and long-distance telephone calls within their systems.318 These facilities, 
COMSAT warns, could be used to channel public-switched message traffic into 
a private customized facility thereby circumventing the SIC Report's recom-
mended restrictions. 3Ig Internationally, COMSAT states, foreign separate sys-
tems might also offer intercontinental routes upon approval of such services 
for the U.S. applicants.32o The F.C.C. would not be able to restrict the traffic 
on these non-U.S. systems to non public-switched message service for traffic 
outside the United States. 321 
Finally, COMSAT and INTELSAT point to market realities as a flaw in the 
SIC proposed restrictions. 322 COMSAT argues that nearly 60 percent of inter-
national communications revenues are generated by those corporations which 
are targeted as users of the alternative systems.323 Thus, COMSAT reasons, the 
customized market is likely to be diverted from INTELSAT's current interna-
313 See Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 614 (Alper written statement); see also 
COMSAT Petition to Deny lSI, supra note 252, at 9. 
314 See Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 602-03, 614 (Alper written statement). 
315 See Policies, Criteria and Procedure, supr(l note 84, at 12. INTELSAT Business Services (IBS) 
offers a flexible variety of satellite services allowing small earth stations on the customers premises. 
INTELSAT has made this service available for "all types of telecommunications services." See Hearings 
before the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 130-31 (Colino written statement). Although it is unclear, 
the SIC Report seems to define customized services as carrying the same offerings as IBS. See SIC 
Report, supra note 2, at 30. 
316 See Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 603-04 (Alper statement). See also Reply 
Of Communications Satellite Corporation To Opposition To Petition To Deny at 6-7, In re Cygnus 
Satellite Corporation, File No. CSS-84-002-P(LA) (May 8, 1984) [hereinafter cited as COMSAT Reply 
to Cygnus]. 
317 See Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 604,610-11 (Alper statement). 
318 This switching equipment is known as private branch exchange (PBX) facilities. While the PBX 
systems ostensibly are used for intra premises connection and transfer of telephone calls, the system 
may be used to connect an incoming local call with an outgoing long distance call. See Customer 
Interconnection, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 798 (1976) (description of PBX systems); Hearings before the House 
Subcomm., supra note 2, at 603-04 (Alper statement) (indentification of routing practices). 
319 Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 604 (Alper statement). 
320/d. at 611-12. 
321 /d. at 61!' 
322/d. at 603. 
3231d. at 596. 
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tional traffic rather than latent markets. 324 A second consideration is the devel-
opment of international fiber optic undersea cables. 325 These cables, owned by 
the public-switched message carriers themselves, are likely to erode INTEL-
SAT's traffic volume for those services which would be protected under the 
SIG recommendations. 32fi 
3. The SIG Analysis 
The SIG Report's underlying assumptions are different from those presented 
by the applicants or by COMSAT and INTELSAT. 
a. INTELSA T's Scope 
While the SIG Report would submit the applications to INTELSAT under 
Article XIV(d), the Report's proposed restrictions indicate the SIG believes 
INTELSA T's primary scope to be limited by the needs of developing coun-
tries.327 The SIG approach would introduce competition to all international 
communication satellite markets except public-switched message service.328 
Thus, the SIG approach would limit the protection of INTELSAT's interna-
tional public telecommunications services to public-switched message services.329 
b. Time Period 
Since the adoption of the Definitive Arrangements, INTELSAT's primary 
source of revenue has been the international public-switched message market. 330 
The SIG proposal argues that, because public-switched message service has 
made up the bulk of INTELSA T's traffic, the significant economic harm analysis 
should be limited to such services.331 This approach would limit Article XIV (d) 
economic protections to the past I NTELSA T traffic patterns. 
324 [d. at 602, 604. 
325 High volume fiber optic undersea cables established to meet u.s. communications requirements 
will be rNTELSAT's principal competition absent separate systems. See Hearings beJore the Senate 
Subcomm., supra note IS, at 153 (Colino statement). 
326 See Hearings beJore the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 888-89 (letter from John J. McLucas, 
COMSAT Executive Vice President, to Rep. John Dingell, Chairman of House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce (August 10, 1984) answering question by Rep. Dingell on effective competitive struc-
tures in international telecommunications). See generally Policies for Overseas Common Carriers, 82 
F.C.C.2d 407, 411 (1980). 
327 See SrG Report, supra note 2, at 21-22. 
328 See SrG Report, supra note 2, at 30-31. See also PanAmSat Opposition, supra note 246, at 2. 
329 SrG Report, supra note 2, at 52. But see Robinson, supra note 228, at 3-6. 
330 SrG Report, supra note 2, at 30. 
mId. at 30-31 (in offering protections only to rNTELSA T's public-switched message traffic the SrG 
approach impliedly exempts customized services from the Article XrV(d) analysis). 
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c. Cumulative Effects 
The market division theory essentially side steps the cumulative issue, since 
the economic harm analysis principally applies to public-switched message ser-
vice.332 Under SIC analysis, the applicants' proposals offer only nonpublic-
switched message services, the cumulative effect of which would be insignificant 
to INTELSAT.333 Thus, following the SIC reasoning, the cumulative effects 
analysis is superfluous because all entrants are limited to the customized services 
market.334 
D. Summary 
In order to satisfy Article XIV(d) principles, the applicants present a series 
of economic protections springing from U.S. domestic market principles,335 and 
estimates of unmet demands and untapped markets.336 The SIC Report rep-
resents a shift in U.S. policy for evaluation of separate systems.337 The method 
of analysis in the SIC Report rests on admittedly unknown market considera-
tions and vague promises of market benefits.338 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The change of the U.S. posItIon against separate intercontinental satellite 
systems leaves only Article XIV to protect INTELSAT's economic health. It is 
unclear whether Article XIV was intended to bear the full weight of protecting 
the INTELSAT system. 339 Nevertheless, those who wish to create separate sys-
332Id. at 30. 
333 I d. at 34-36. 
334/d. at 30. 
m See, e.g., lSI Application, supra note I, at 35. 
336 See generally id. at 10. 
337 The previous United States interpretation of economic harm is found in a letter from James L. 
Buckley, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology for the Department of 
State, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, regarding applications by 
U.S. domestic satellite facilities to international service authorization. Transborder Satellite Video Services, 
supra note 98, at 287, Appendix A. Under Secretary Buckley indicated that while the United States 
fully supported INTELSAT, U.S. domestic systems might be used for international public telecom-
munications " ... where the global system could not provide the service required ... [or] the service 
planned would be clearly uneconomical or impractical using the INTELSAT system." Id. at 288. The 
Buckley analysis is a clear one, asking whether INTELSAT can technically and efficiently provide the 
proposed route. 
338 SIC Report, supra note 2, at 35. 
339 Article XIV reflects a balance between the signatories' business interests in protecting their 
investment and the parties demands for freedom in constructing communications facilities to serve 
their public. The matrix of non-binding recommendations and good faith requirements are the 
trappings of diplomacy and not arms-length business dealings. At the INTELSAT Agreements ne-
gotiation it was thought that the members' investment in the system was a sufficient disincentive to 
their participation in threatening separate systems. See Statement of the Representative of the United 
Kingdom, INTELSAT Travawc Preparatoires SRlI9 at 3 (March 3, 1970). 
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terns have presented theories according to which their proposals would be 
consistent with Article XIV protections.34o 
The inclusion of Article XIV, paragraphs (c), (d), and (e)341 and the procedure 
for subsequent coordination of separate domestic342 and regional systems343 
make it clear that INTELSAT is not mandated to carryall satellite telecom-
munications. Thus, though INTELSAT is not a monopoly in the strict sense, 
by precluding competitive systems it maintains a monopolist's power to set prices 
and average costs across all international routes.344 The technical, economic 
requirements, and direct communications links provisions of Article XIV (d) are 
obstacles to member undercutting of the price averaging power. 345 
The specialized services argument presented by Orion and Cygnus346 is an 
insubstantial veil, created by applying F.C.C. definitions to the INTELSAT 
Agreement.347 Orion and Cygnus hope to exempt their systems from the eco-
nomic protections afforded INTELSAT under Article XIV (d) through the novel 
nature of their proposed marketing arrangements and the contingency nature 
of Article XIV(e).348 While the Orion and Cygnus economic arrangements may 
be unique, INTELSAT has, in a previous coordination, considered the very 
services contemplated by Orion and Cygnus to be public telecommunications 
services under Article XIV(d).349 
The various market diversion theories presented by lSI, RCA Americom, 
and PanAmSat350 stand on tenuous ground. The promise of latent markets, 
long term growth, and the benefits of competition in international telecom-
340 See supra text accompanying notes 204-20, 246-63, 305-12. 
341 See supra text accompanying notes 126-41. 
342 See Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 94 (1970). 
343 See generally Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 16. 
344 See Article V(d), INTELSAT Agreements, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3823. See also infra note 351 (whether 
cross-subsidization exists). A decrease in traffic in one region may affect the price for services in 
another region because INTELSAT services are broken between three regional systems, yet the rates 
are set globally. The introduction of competition in the AOR will usurp INTELSAT's power to set 
prices along the duplicative routes, thus forcing either competitive tariffs or traffic loss to lower priced 
systems. There must either be disparity in pricing between regions or an effect on the average pricing. 
See SNOW, supra note 25, at 47-50. See also Walter Hinchman Associates, Inc., The Economics of 
International Satellite Communications at 14-18, Attachments No. I to INTELSAT Doc. BT-59-34E 
W/6/84 (May 18, 1984) (prepared for INTELSAT) [hereinafter cited as Walter Hinchman Associates, 
Economics] . 
345 Article XIV(d) is intended to protect that price-averaging power. See Hearings before the House 
Subcomm., supra note 2, at 77-78 (Washburn statement). See also supra text accompanying notes 135-
38. 
346 See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text. 
347 See, e.g., Orion Opposition, supra note 209, at 14-17. See also supra text accompanying notes 212-
20. 
348 See generally Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 60-66. 
349 See ECS II Coordination, supra note 90, at I. 
350 See supra text accompanying notes 246-63. 
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munications are as of yet unproven.351 Further, focus on the traffic diversion 
of a single transatlantic system against the entire traffic base of the INTELSAT 
system masks the true effect of the competition.352 With the introduction of 
competition, INTELSAT would lose the monopolist's power to average rates 
on a global basis.353 A proper diversion analysis should focus on the impact on 
rates along duplicative routes and the resulting effects on INTELSAT's capi-
talization requirements and rate making procedures.354 
The SIC approach355 is perhaps the least defensible. The SIC Report incor-
porates the fallacies of the specialized services theory356 and the unproven 
351 The analogies drawn to the benefits of competition in the U.S. domestic satellite telecommuni-
cations industry, see e.g., Cygnus Application, supra note I, at 72-74, nn. 64 & 65, do not necessarily 
apply to international satellite telecommunications. While the domestic industry may be totally con-
trolled by the F.C.C., the international industry is effected by each of the PTT's. See Hearings before 
the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 857 (Washburn written statement). In light of the wrench-like 
control foreign authorities maintain over communications intercourse across their borders, the promise 
of tapping latent markets and the other benefits of domestic competition are not assured. See generally 
E. Kwerel, Fed. Com. Commission, OPP Working Paper Series, Promoting Competition Piecemeal in 
International Telecommunications, at 10-12 (Dec. 1984). See also B. Rein, B. McDonald, D. Adams, 
R. Nielsen & C. Frank, Implementation of a U.S. "Free Entry" Initiative for Transatlantic Satellite 
Facilities: Problems, Pitfalls and Possibilities, at 13-14 (July 3, 1984). But see PanAmSat Opposition, 
supra note 246, at 5-6. 
352 The INTELSAT system consists of satellite facilities serving the Atlantic (AOR), Pacific (PaR), 
and Indian (lOR) Ocean regions. See SNOW, supra note 25, at 87-91 (discussion of the economics of 
three separate regional satellite systems). In that four of the five applicants hope to offer transatlantic 
service, the resulting diversion would have a more profound effect on the AOR traffic than on the 
estimated global traffic. 
353 See Hearings before the House Subcomm., supra note 2, at 605-06 (Alper written statement). 
354 See generally Walter Hinchman Associates, Inc., The Economics of International Satellite Com-
munications, Vol. I, at 4-8 (May 18, 1984) (Attachment No. I to INTELSAT Doc. BG-59-34E H/6/ 
84). See also Walter Hinchman Associates, Inc., Significant Economic Harm, at 21-23 (August 15, 
1984) (Attachment No.1 to INTELSAT Doc. BG-60-63E W/9/84). But also K. Dunmore, Dale N. 
Hatfield Associates, An Analysis of the INTELSAT Subsidy Issue, at 39-40 (August 1983) (on file at 
the F.C.C. with the Orion Application, supra note 1) (a counter-analysis by INTELSAT region). Much 
debate has been aired over whether route cross-subsidization exists within the INTELSAT system. See, 
e.g., Hearings before the Senate Subcomm., supra note 15, at 151, (Colino statement). This is unfortunate 
because the issue of route cross-subsidization is superfluous to a United States costlbenefit analysis 
concerning the separate systems. The INTELSAT Agreements expressly contemplate rate-averaging 
regardless of route cross-subsidization. Article V(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 344; see also 
Hearings before the Senate Subcomm., supra note 2, at 87-88, (Colino statement). Thus, unless one is 
debating whether to change the financial principles of INTELSAT, the issue is the global effect of the 
introduction of separate systems. 
Furthermore, in practice the United States benefits from the INTELSAT members' belief that the 
cost-averaging dynamic subsidizes their telecommunications expenses. This benefit is manifest in 
international political goodwill garnered by the United States, regardless of the truth of the underlying 
belief. In other words, the United States enjoys the appreciation of developing countries for the believed 
less than unit cost of their international telecommunications charges, not the actual cost. 
Should the subsidy exist, the Agreements are operating as envisioned and the issue is whether to 
amend them. Should no subsidy or a reverse subsidy exist, the United States is being charged at or 
below cost for its space segment use and still receives the global goodwill benefit. 
355 See supra text accompanying notes 305-12. 
356 The SIG Report indicates that market entry of user-dedicated satellite systems will not cause 
INTELSAT economic harm. SIG Report, supra note 2, at 34-36. 
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assertions of market diversion theory357 in presenting an approach for protect-
ing INTELSA T. The SIC approach divides the international telecommunica-
tions markets into protected and competitive segments without a hint of legis-
lative or precedential authority.358 The porous protections proposed by the SIC 
Report are subject to immediate circumvention,35g incapable of being policed,360 
and diminish with time.361 The SIC Report is a strained attempt to justify a 
unilateral U.S. decision to restructure the international communications satellite 
industry. 
Ultimately, the Federal Communications Commission must weigh its com-
munications requirements and the perceived benefits of the alternative systems 
against the economic damage that the creation of such systems will cause to 
INTELSAT.362 The framework for making the required determination rests on 
three significant factors: 1) the scope of INTELSAT's economic protections;363 
2) the time period for which economic harm is to be analyzed; and 3) the scope 
of the proposed systems. The determination is particularly vexing because the 
arguments presented by the applicants, by COMSAT, and by INTELSAT are 
all based on disparate underlying assumptions regarding these factors. 
INTELSAT's primary objective is to supply satellite facilities for its signatories 
on a nondiscriminatory basis.364 Article XIV(d)'s protections were aimed at 
precluding competitive systems.365 Should the service in question be between 
signatories,366 the economic protections found in Article XIV (d) would apply. 
357 See supra note 351 and accompanying text. 
358 The SIG reasoning rests entirely on the economic insulation of INTELSAT through predicted 
market trends. A similar argument concerning the protection of IRCs upon the entry of COMSAT to 
the retail leased circuits market was rejected by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in ITT World 
Communications, Inc. v. F.e.C., 725 F.2d 732, 749-50 (1984). 
359 See supra text accompanying notes 318-19. 
360 Should separate systems be restricted to customized services, the question arises as to who will 
monitor the competitors to insure their compliance. 
36! With the introduction of fiber optic undersea cables owned by the U.S. public-switched message 
networks, more of that traffic is likely to be routed away from the INTELSAT system and over the 
carrier-owned facilities. See supra note 325. 
362 47 U.s.c. § 701(d) (1982). Although the F.C.C. granted conditional approval of five separate 
satellite systems, supra note 6, the INTELSAT coordination process may require that the F.C.C. 
reconsider the applications. See supra text accompanying notes 159 & 160. 
363 INTELSAT's primary objective is to provide facilities for "International public telecommunica-
tions." Article III (a), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 54. 
364 See Article I(k), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 232 (between approved earth stations having 
access to INTELSAT). See also Article III(a), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 54 (scope of IN-
TELSAT services). 
365 See supra note 135. 
366 Services which are not "for further transmission to the public," such as direct broadcast or, 
perhaps, mobile point to mobile point, are outside INTELSAT's prime objective by way of Article I(k) 
and (I). See supra note 232 (public and specialized service definitions). In the AlgeriaiINTERSPUTNIK 
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Thus "international public telecommunications" under the INTELSAT Agree-
ments should be interpreted as all international satellite traffic generated by the 
INTELSAT signatories. 367 
The INTELSAT Agreement is clearly forward looking.368 The text of Article 
XIV(d) specifically refers to planned INTELSAT space segment.369 At issue is 
how far forward the economic harm analysis should be applied to future mar-
kets. 37o The answer may be found in the intent of the Article XIV protections. 
Ultimately, the competition sought to be avoided by Article XIV(d) is that which 
would threaten the signatories' investments in the system. In the event a party 
should violate its obligations, Article XVI outlines the process for withdrawal. 
Article XVI(k) specifically provides that the offending party may be liable for 
its share of capital contributions in contractual commitments and liabilities arising 
from acts prior to removal. 37I Clearly, the negotiators of the Definitive Arrange-
ments were concerned with protecting the capitalization of INTELSAT's con-
coordination INTELSAT was presented with the issue of whether signatory/non-signatory traffic was 
within economic harm consideration. AlgeriallNTERSPUTNIK Coordination. supra note 96. While 
finding no significant economic harm in the Algerian proposal. INTELSAT warned. " ... if INTEL-
SAT Signatories in general were prepared to see their satellite traffic with non-member countries carried 
on another system instead of their own system. the potential for economic harm to INTELSAT would 
not be insignificant." [d. at 6. (emphasis added). Thus. service between a signatory and a non-signatory 
is within the scope of international public telecommunications services and Article XIV (d) protections 
apply. But see Statement by the Representative of France. INTELSAT Travawc Preparatoires Com IISRI 
II at 2 (such non-signatory systems should be outside economic harm analysis). 
367 See. e.g .• ECS II Coordination. supra note 90. at 8. This analysis is supported by the conservative 
economic nature of INTELSAT. It is a commercially-oriented cooperative that is insulated from 
competition by Article XIV. The public telecommunications/specialized services dichotomy and the 
one-party-one-vote rule of the Assembly act as disincentives to risk-taking in the introduction of new 
services. Thus. INTELSAT offers all public international telecommunications services which are safely 
profitable and. therefore. is less likely to either enter expensive high-risk markets or offer services of 
use to only a few member countries. 
Under the equation of signatory-offered international services with internationaJ public telecom-
munications. all such services which have been deemed commercially unprofitable by the signatories 
are outside the INTELSAT primary objective. This shields INTELSAT from pressures to invest in 
risky or sophisticated services of use to only a few members. It also shifts the risk for developing such 
services to non-INTELSAT entities. See Statement by the Federal Republic of Germany. INTELSAT 
Travawc Preparatoires Com 1132 at I (inclusion of services in INTELSAT depends on their rentability). 
The definition of international public telecommunications services as signatories' international traffic 
is supported by the ECS II coordination through INTELSA T's reasoning that the separate system 
would develop markets which INTELSAT could then access upon its provision of the service. See 
Policies. Criteria and Procedures. supra note 84. at 34 ~ 3(b). 
368 The Preamble expresses the parties desire to continue the development of the single system 
INTELSAT. Preamble. INTELSAT Agreements. supra note 35. The INTELSAT Agreements' Articles 
lI(a) and III(a) refer to carrying forward the INTELSAT organization. Articles lI(a) & III (a). IN-
TELSAT Agreements. supra note 10.23 U.S.T. 3813.3818 & 3819. 
369 The word "planned" is used in the context of technical coordination. Article XIV(d). INTELSAT 
Agreements. supra note 134. 
370 See supra text accompanying notes 284-88. The SIG recommendations' historical orientation is 
without support in the text. spirit. or negotiating history of INTELSAT. 
371 Article XVI(k). INTELSAT Agreements. supra note 10.23 U.S.T. 3813. 3861. 
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tractual commitments. Although the INTELSAT Agreements are silent on the 
length of time that Article XIV (d) protections apply, Article XVI(k) would 
indicate that the economic harm analysis should be applied over a time period 
extending to the length of applicable INTELSAT contractual commitments. 372 
The potential for numerous private alternative system applications is unique 
to the United States. Other countries, due to centralization of services in their 
PTT's, have no pressure to diversify and thus would propose a single alternative 
system.373 This situation was foreseen in the Definitive Arrangements negotia-
tions and addressed in both the structure of the Agreement374 and in Article 
XIV.375 According to the Transborder decisions, a party is responsible for making 
a preliminary case-by-case analysis of the possible economic harm posed by a 
proposed system.376 The proposal is then submitted to INTELSAT for findings 
regarding the technical and economic impact of the system. 377 INTELSAT may, 
if appropriate, consider the proposal in light of simultaneous or expected future 
proposals of the same nature and their cumulative effects on INTELSAT's 
traffic base. 378 
While all the U.S. applications may be reviewed together before being sub-
mitted to INTELSAT, it is unrealistic for the F.C.C. to evaluate foreign systems 
in its initial consideration.379 The Assembly, however, is specifically tasked to 
evaluate such alternatives and make its recommendations known to the applicant 
parties. 380 Thus, the cumulative effect of U.S. applications should be weighed 
by the F.C.C. in making its original determinations and the cumulative effect 
372 For a proposed transatlantic system, for example, the time period for economic analysis should 
be the length of INTELSAT's contractual commitments for transatlantic route facilities. 
373 See, e.g., ARABSAT Coordination, supra note 94 (system proposed to INTELSAT jointly by 
parties and signatories). 
374 Articles VII & VIII, INTELSAT Agreements, supra notes 67 & 68 (allowing membership by 
parties and signatories). 
375 Article XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 134. 
376 See, e.g., 88 F.C.C.2d at 283-85. It should be noted that in the Transborder case the various 
applications were considered by type of service. Under this method, PanAmSat which is proposing a 
north/south routing, should be considered separately from the other applications which propose east! 
west routing. 
377 See, e.g., Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97. 
378 Compare Policies, Criteria and Procedures, supra note 84, at 34 \l 3(b) (coordination for applicant 
countries as well as certain potential future users) with EeS II Coordination, supra note 90 (coordination 
for increased scope of the ECS system). The point here is that INTELSAT sets the parameters of its 
inquiry into economic harm which may be as wide as all potential systems. 
379 Indeed, under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, foreign policy questions were specifically 
delegated to the President. The F.C.C. was charged with the technicalities of promulgating the inter-
national system and regulating U.S. access. 47 U.S.c. § 721(a) & (c) (1982). It is unclear to what extent 
the SIG and the President considered the cumulative impact of alternative systems in making their 
recommendations. See supra text accompanying notes 332-34. 
380 Article XIV(d), INTELSAT Agreements, supra note 134. Article VII(c)(vii), INTELSAT Agree-
ments, supra note 154. 
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of the foreign systems should be considered by the Assembly in making its 
recommendations. 
A close reading of the negotiating history, the INTELSAT Agreements, and 
previous coordinations uncovers a framework for evaluating economic harm. 
The Article XIV(d) analysis should apply to all international markets presently 
served or serviceable by INTELSAT signatories within a time period set by 
relevant contractual commitments. 3S ! The cumulative effect on INTELSAT of 
U.S.-proposed separate international systems should be weighed by the F.C.C. 
and the cumulative effect of all separate international systems should be con-
sidered in the Assembly's recommendations under Article XIV(d).382 
INTELSAT must first determine whether the proposed market is technically 
or economically within INTELSA T's traffic base, the base being limited by the 
contractual commitment time period.383 If the proposed services are duplicative, 
then INTELSAT must perform a diversion analysis,384 estimating the economic 
effect of the proposed system(s) and the maximum level of diversion permissible 
without damaging the capitalization of INTELSAT investments. 385 For future 
markets, INTELSAT must determine the amount of use and consequent rev-
enue required to capitalize its investment. 386 
Perhaps one solution would be to read Article XIV(d) in light of its true 
intent: to protect the signatories' investments. Should the United States conclude 
that separate systems are necessary, the F.C.C. might set a floor for the volume 
for U.S. traffic to be carried by INTELSAT over a specified time period. 387 As 
long as INTELSAT traffic remains above these levels, separate systems would 
be welcome to develop new markets. 388 
381 See supra text accompanying notes 367 & 371. 
382 See supra notes 379 & 380 and accompanying text. 
383 Inherent in this analysis is a determination of INTELSA T's present and future markets as well 
as the separate systems' future markets. In making this determination, INTELSAT has traditionally 
looked to both the type of message being communicated (e.g., television, switched message, telecon-
ferencing), see ECS II Coordination, supra note 90, and the equipment used (e.g., micro-dish antennae, 
bandwidth requirements), see Transborder I Coordinations, supra note 97. The applicants must prove 
the proposed services will not usurp INTELSAT traffic. See COLI NO, Monograph, supra note 3, at 94. 
384 See supra text accompanying note 354. 
385 This analysis may weigh the combined effects of all proposed systems but should be done on a 
basis that estimates the effects in terms of the planned routes (e.g., CONUS to Western Europe). See 
supra text accompanying notes 353 & 3.1)4. 
386 For example, with IBS, INTELSAT should identify the calculated transponder space allocated 
to that service to determine the traffic needed to capitalize the associated investment. 
387 A mandated minimum traffic flow as an economic protection is not unfamiliar to the INTELSAT 
parties. In the First Plenipotentiary conference France suggested mandatory traffic routing as a 
protection for INTELSAT against threatening regional systems. See Statement by the Representative 
of France, INTELSAT Travaux Preparatoires Com I1SRlI2 at 3. 
388 The United States might negotiate as to the minimum traffic levels necessary for capitalization 
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The United States shift to endorse separate international satellite systems 
need not preface INTELSAT's decline. While the applicants, COMSAT, IN-
TELSAT, and the U.S. government shape their arguments to fit the obligations 
of the INTELSAT Agreements, a workable short-term solution is available. 
Mandated minimum U.S. traffic loading of the INTELSAT system would satisfy 
the demands of all the concerned parties. Such a solution would demand a new 
reading of the INTELSAT Agreements and the jettison of the traditional dip-
lomatic compromises which trail in the wake of previous coordinations. The 
reality is that the INTELSAT Agreements establish a satellite system to carry 
international signatory traffic. When technology reaches beyond the limits of 
signatories' facilities, the INTELSAT Agreement should not be read to forestall 
progress. 
Invin B. Schwartz 
of facilities. INTELSAT would be free to capture additional traffic. Further, the F.C.C. has a long 
history of enforcing mandatory routing levels. 
While differing with this method of regulation, the SIG agrees that separate systems "should be 
authorized under regulatory terms and conditions that will hold them to their commitments and 
ensure that their attention is focused on serving and developing the customized service market." SIG 
Report, supra note 2, at 30. 
